

Book Reviews

Michael Frede, *A Free Will. Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought*. Ed. A. A. Long, with a foreword by David Sedley. Berkeley: University of California Press 2011, 224 pp.

This is the culminating work of a uniquely brilliant career that began in 1967 with a ground-breaking dissertation on Plato's *Sophist* (*Prädikation und Existenzaussage*). But this last and most ambitious of Michael Frede's works might never have seen the light of day without the editorial work of Tony Long. When Frede died in a swimming accident in Greece in 2007, the manuscript was not in publishable form. Frede had been working on it ever since delivering the Sather lectures in 1997, but he had not finally revised these lectures for publication. It is only because of Long's devoted editing that these important studies have finally been made available to the scholarly world.

Frede's Sather lectures were originally announced under the title "The Origins of the Notion of the Will". Long has chosen instead as book title "A Free Will", because, as he says, Frede makes clear in the introduction that "what chiefly concerns him are the origins of the notion of a free will" (xii). This deviation in title points to a certain ambiguity in the theme of Frede's study. On the one hand, he is responding to Albrecht Dihle's Sather lectures on *The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity* (Berkeley 1982), and contesting Dihle's claim that Augustine played a decisive role in the development of the notion of will. On the other hand, Frede is interested in pursuing the concept of freedom of the will as it emerged in Stoicism and became central in later controversies, above all in Christian theology. This shift in topic is explicitly recognized in Frede's chapter headings: "The emergence of a notion of will in Stoicism" for Chapter Three; "The emergence of a notion of a free will in Stoicism" for Chapter Five. But Frede does not directly confront the question how far the increasing concern with freedom of the will in late antiquity alters the original Stoic theory of action as articulated by Chrysippus and developed by Epictetus.

On the other hand, Frede's account is dazzlingly clear on the radical innovation of the Stoic theory of voluntary action. "Neither Plato nor Aristotle has a notion of a will" (19). On the basis of this fundamental insight, Frede in Chapter Two gives a subtle and penetrating account of the classical theory of action and decision, implicit in Plato and more fully worked out by Aristotle. This is probably the best account that has ever been given of the Aristotelian theory. According to this classical view, human actions are to be explained by two competing sources of motivation: "appetite" or non-rational desire (*epithumein*), which is shared by children and animals, and rational desire for an object judged to be good (*boulesthai*), which is distinctive of adult human beings. As Frede points out, both kinds of motivation can be responsible for actions that are voluntary (*hêkôn*), that is to say, spontaneous or unforced. But (as he notes) the term "voluntary" may be misleading, since it suggests the notion of a will (*voluntas*), which is absent from the theory. This classical Greek distinction between rational and non-rational desire tends to be blurred in Latin, where the verb *velle* (and the corresponding noun *voluntas*) serves to translate both Greek verbs. One might suggest (although Frede does not) that the notion of the will tends automatically to develop in Latin, where a single verb is used to express both rational and non-rational desire.¹

¹ One small dissent from Frede's account: on page 20 he seems to suggest that *boulesthai* in Greek is derived from the same root as *velle/wollen/will*. The issue here is linguistic rather than philosophical, but it is worth noting that there is no etymological link whatsoever between the Greek *boulomai* and the Indo-European family of verbs corresponding to *will*.

To say that there is no concept of the will in Plato and Aristotle is to recognize that, in a case of conflict between a rational desire (*boulêsis*) and an appetite, “there is not a further instance that would adjudicate or resolve the matter. In particular, reason is not made to appear in two roles, first as presenting its own case and then as adjudicating the conflict by making a decision or choice” (24). What is distinctive of the concept of the will (when it eventually appears in Stoic theory) is that it introduces the action of reason in this second, decisive role.

When this new notion of the will begins to take shape in late Stoicism, it will be expressed by a different term, namely *prohairesis*. This terminology signals a radical break from the classical notion of rational motivation expressed by *boulêsis*, as desire for an object judged to be good. As Frede observes, the Greeks will be “late and hesitant” in using *boulêsis* for the new notion. In Aristotle the term *prohairesis* had served to designate a deliberate choice, that is, the considered selection of an action that is “up to us” or in our power. The use of this term by the Stoics, beginning with Epictetus, serves precisely to focus the notion of motivation on the concept of a conscious choice, and consequently on the notion of freedom. Thus Epictetus says, “the tyrant can fetter my leg, but not even Zeus can conquer my *prohairesis*”. As Frede shows, it is for the first time with Epictetus, at the end of the first century A.D., that this new notion of willing as the decisive principle of motivation is articulated, and also identified as the locus of human freedom. But although such freedom is in principle available to every human being, it is in fact defined only by reference to the ideal of the Stoic sage. For most of us, our *prohairesis* or principle of choice will be a slave to passion.

In Chapter Three, “On the Emergence of a Notion of Will in Stoicism”, Frede explains in detail how this new conception of the will, with its link to freedom, is prepared in earlier Stoicism by a complete break from the classical theory of mind and action. The story is too complex to be retold here, but the crucial Stoic innovation comes in the notion of assent (*sunkatathesis*). This is the principle that every adult human action presupposes an element of assent, i.e. a rational judgment of approval. According to this theory, what had previously counted as irrational desires will not issue in action unless they are assented to by reason. And it is this notion of assent that will provide the basis for the development of the will with its freedom in later Stoicism. For the Stoics, every human action (if not done under compulsion or in ignorance) is assented to, and hence done voluntarily or willingly. The Platonic-Aristotelian distinction between rational and non-rational desires will reappear only as a subdivision of voluntary action “between *boulêseis* in a narrower sense, namely, reasonable willings, the kind of willings only a wise person has, and appetites (*epithumiai*), unreasonable willings, which is what we who are not wise have” (43). The notion of assent is central to the action theory of early Stoicism, but it is only with Epictetus that this notion acquires a new psychological depth, as an inner willingness that may or may not succeed in outer action. And it is this notion of an inner assent – which even Zeus cannot control – that defines the territory of the will proper, and hence that of freedom as a Stoic ideal (47 and 85).

In subsequent chapters, Frede shows how this late Stoic notion of willing (expressed not only as *prohairesis* but also as *thelesis* and *boulêsis*) is gradually taken over by the other pagan schools and finally by Christian thinkers as well. But in these later views freedom of the will is no longer the prerogative of an ideal sage. When such freedom is universalized to become the common possession of ordinary mortals, a fundamental change takes place. For Alexander of Aphrodisias, freedom becomes “a condition for voluntariness and thus for responsibility, [...] a condition for what is up to us” (96). It thus becomes a feature of the human condition and not a prerogative of the Sage.

With Alexander (an Aristotelian of the late second century A.D.) we reach what is almost the modern notion of freedom of the will: “there is no merit or demerit in what you are doing, unless

you could have acted otherwise, indeed unless you could have chosen to act otherwise” (99). On this view, an action is free only if the agent also has the power (*exousia*) not to do it. A conception of this kind becomes essential for Christianity, in connection with the doctrine of the Last Judgment. Frede shows in detail the importance of this for Origen, the first major Christian philosopher, in the first half of the third century. Origen insists “that we will be punished or rewarded according to the way that we have lived, because we are free”. We will be held responsible for our actions because the human soul is rational “and endowed with a free will” (107). We recognize that the free will, which was originally the prerogative of the Stoic sage, has now become the basis for evaluating every human action. Origen is roughly contemporary with Plotinus, to whom Frede devotes a brilliant chapter, with a detailed commentary on the unique discussion of free will in *Ennead* VI.8.

Chapter Nine is devoted to Augustine and to a controversial discussion of Dihle’s claim that the notion of the will as used in modern philosophy “was invented by St. Augustine”.² Frede argues, on the contrary, that “Augustine’s notion of the will is just a version of the more complex Stoic notion of the will” (159). (Augustine’s view is less complex because he “renders both *willing* and *choosing* by *velle*”, 158.) The essential dependence of Augustine’s concept of the will on Stoic doctrine had been noted by others.³ But this dependence does not settle the matter at issue between Frede and Dihle. Frede’s account of the conceptual development underlying Augustine’s view is infinitely more precise and penetrating than Dihle’s. Nevertheless, Dihle may be sensitive to something new and different in Augustine that Frede does not take into account. And here I may recall a personal discussion with Michael Frede on differences between the Greek and Hebrew conceptions of God. The notion of a personal God – a God with whom one can have a conversation – has always seemed to me a distinctly Biblical, that is to say Judaeo-Christian conception (possibly a Muslim conception as well). The supreme deity of a Greek philosopher is not a person to whom one could speak and listen, as one does to God in the Bible. In our discussion of these matters, Michael Frede was never willing to see these differences as significant. And in the present work he freely uses the capitalized form “God” in referring to the highest principle of Plotinus or the Stoics. He means, in effect, to take a definite position on a controversial issue in the interpretation of late ancient philosophy. At what point does a new, Biblical conception of God enter the mainstream of philosophy? Or does the acceptance of Biblical religion not introduce anything fundamentally new in the philosophical conception of deity? Frede’s view seems to be that, in the language of the Church Fathers, the Biblical God simply replaced Zeus as a figure of speech for the highest philosophical principle.⁴

As a result, although Dihle’s specific interpretation cannot be defended against Frede’s criticism, I believe there is something deep in Dihle’s view of Augustine that Frede does not recognize. When Jesus says, “Not as I will, but as thou wilt”, he is appealing to a specifically Bib-

² A. Dihle, *The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity*, Berkeley 1982, 123. Dihle assumes that this is the general view; it plays a central role in his account of the ancient development of the notion.

³ See, for example, R. A. Gauthier, *L’Éthique à Nicomaque*, 2nd. ed., Louvain 1970, Vol. I, 261f.

⁴ Compare 151: “It is becoming increasingly clear that there is very little in the so-called Judaeo-Christian way of thinking about things which is specifically Judaeo-Christian.” And earlier: “I am inclined to think that almost all philosophers in late antiquity were monotheists” (143). Thus, Frede fails to distinguish monotheism (belief in *only* one God) from henotheism (belief in a single highest deity). It is the latter, but never the former, that is typical of the pagan philosophers. Only the Biblical God is a jealous god.

lical conception of the divine will, as expressed in divine commands, and hence he is invoking a personal conception of God that is (I think) alien to the Greek philosophical tradition. What seems to be true in Dihle's thesis is that, with Augustine, this Biblical conception of the will of God as the will of a transcendent person, serves to transform the human person's understanding of his or her own will. Specialists in Augustine will have to deal with this radical disagreement between Frede and Dihle. That is not my role. But I do find – as the only significant defect in what is otherwise an utterly admirable book – that Frede was temperamentally blind to the implications for the philosophical conception of deity of a religious tradition that is based not only on the principle of revelation but, more fundamentally, on the possibility of an I – Thou relation, that is, on a person-to-person conversation between man and God. And in this tradition it is appropriate to write "God" with a capital letter, since here the word represents a proper name and not a descriptive noun. That fact separates every Jewish or Christian theologian from every Greek philosopher from Plato to Plotinus, no matter how deeply the metaphysics of the former is influenced by the pagan tradition of the latter.

So of course there is room for qualification or dissent about specific features of Frede's interpretation. But one can only feel awe before the breadth of his learning and the depth of his insight. We can be grateful to Tony Long and University of California Press for making this magnificent work available to us.

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Michael Renemann, *Gedanken als Wirkursachen. Francisco Suárez zur geistigen Hervorbringung* (Bochumer Studien zur Philosophie, Bd. 49). Amsterdam/Philadelphia: B. R. Grüner 2010, IX, 173 pp.

Nowadays it is not very often the case that one can find a book dealing exclusively with the philosophy of the so-called second scholasticism. Despite the recent boom in scholarship, there are still only a few monographic titles dealing with the issues of early modern scholastic philosophy and theology. The expectation is even greater when the subject-matter of a new title, *Gedanken als Wirkursachen. Francisco Suárez zur geistigen Hervorbringung*, written by Michael Renemann, is concerned with the icon of the given period, Francisco Suárez (1548–1617), and with the issue of ideas and exemplary causality in the context of (human) artistic production, which can be considered as "the field unploughed" of Suarezian research (cf. Renemann's remark, 13).

Why should Suárez's doctrine of ideas, that of the practical concepts regulating artists's production, be taken as the significant theme in contemporary research into Suárez's philosophy? It is because of the clarification of Suárez's theory of concept which, no doubt, constitutes the rather controversial issue in the contemporary discussion. Suárez's logical writings and commentaries are not available, and thus, if one wants to find out more about the given issue, one has to delve into the vast and deep ocean of his *Metaphysical Disputations* (*Disputationes metaphysicae*). It is especially Suárez's theory of the ontological status of the objective concept (*conceptus objectivus*), being absolutely central to Suárez's metaphysical project as a whole (it is the objective concept of real being [*ens reale*] that creates the proper and adequate object of his metaphysics), which requires clarification. The basic question, raised in the current discussion, is

whether the objective concept is to be considered as the intramental entity different from the cognitive (intellective) act, otherwise the formal concept (*conceptus formalis*), being nothing else than the accident, by which the extramental thing is apprehended, or whether it can be regarded as the extramental thing itself. The answer to the question can give us important advice about the possible realism, or mentalism, of Suárez's metaphysics.

The main contribution of Renemann's book is that it draws attention to the text of Suárez's *Metaphysical Disputations* (*DM*), namely *DM 25, De causa exemplaris*, which has often been neglected by scholars discussing the issue of the objective concept in favour of other passages, especially those of *DM 2 (De ratione essentiali seu conceptu entis)*, *DM 8 (De veritate seu vero, quod est passio entis)* and *DM 54 (De entibus rationis)*. The analysis of *DM 25* sheds light that is highly indigent for the clarification of the ontological status of the objective concept.

The book is divided into three parts. In the first part, after the introduction (*Einleitung*, 1–14), the author sets forth the doctrines of four medieval authors (Aquinas, Scotus, Auriol, and Ockham) considered as historically determinative for Suárez's doctrine of ideas (17–48). In the second part the theories of ideas of no less than seven early modern scholastics are presented (Pedro Fonseca, Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza, Johannes a Santo Thoma, Rodrigo de Arriaga, Francisco de Oviedo, Johannes Poncius, and Richard Lynch, 59–100). The *raison d'être* is to create the immediate systematical context of Suárez's doctrine. In the part devoted to Suárez, at first, the issue of Suárez's theory of the formal and objective concept is analysed (103–118). Then, in the contraposition to the theory of two of the foremost Baroque Scotists Bartholomew Mastrius (having the epithet "Princeps Scotistarum") and Bonaventure Belluto, Renemann analyses Suárez's theory of ideas (119–128). After the brief outline of the nature of speculative and practical intellect from Suárez's commentary to *De anima* (129–131), two subsequent chapters (ch. 16, "Überblick: Suárez und sein Umfeld", and ch. 17, "Ausblick I.", 133–148) are devoted to Suárez's theory of ideas and concepts in the comparison to the teachings of the main rival scholastic schools (Scotists, Thomists, and Nominalists) and (so to say, obligatorily) to Descartes as well. As the second "Ausblick", the author establishes the doctrinal proximity of Suárez's theory of ideas with Heinrich Wölfflin's (1864–1945) theory of art production. In two last sub-chapters the given resemblance is confirmed by the interpretation of two pieces of art, one being a picture (Pablo Picasso's "Basler Stilleben"), the second a novel (Marcel Proust's "In Search of Lost Time", 151–159).

How does Suárez define ideas? Coming out of the crucial text (*DM 2*, section 1, paragraph 1), in which Suárez exposes his explicit definition of the objective and formal concept of the speculative intellect, Suárez embraces the opinion that ideas are practical formal concepts; in other words, the cognitive acts, which (in contrast to the theoretical formal concepts, which are measured by things) measures *res artificiales*. In contrast to Peter Auriol, for Renemann apparently one of the most important (though mainly in the negative sense) medieval authorities for Suárez, the Jesuit, starts from the situation of perfect knowledge in which an artist, being engaged in the production, comes to know things at each time as they are (119). The permanent concomitancy of an artist's cognition and production does not allow for the discrepancy between an (imperfect) model (*imperfectum exemplar*) and the final product. The practical formal concepts are thus seen by Suárez as the attentive acts of mind (*acies mentis*), which are the real (entitative) accidents of the mind. In quality of that entitative feature they accordingly exercise efficient causality. The important factor of controllability of production is not ensured by the explicit (formal) reflection objectifying the former cognitive act, but only (and, for Suárez, sufficiently) by the accompanying reflection upon that cognitive act. That concomitant reflection does not perceive that act as "*quod*" (that would turn the virtual reflection into the formal reflection) but only

as “*quo*” (124–127). By laying the emphasis on the act-like and expressional nature of the exemplary causality, Suárez *ipso facto* comes to the denial of all forms of pre-design (*Vorkonzeption*) which, if they are to be causally active, have to be volitionally imitated. Just the refusal and transgression of the model of pre-design is what, according to Renemann, places Suárez’s theory on the higher reflexive level in the theory of art production (5).

Suárez basically distinguished two basic models of preconceptions. What is imitated is either an extramental thing, or some intramental entity, whether a form (*verbum mentis*) terminating the cognitive act (in the same way as the point terminates the line), which is the theory embraced by the orthodox Thomist John of St. Thomas (1589–1644), or the intramental thing having the special diminutive being (*esse deminutum*), held by Scotists, or having *esse apparentiae*, being advocated by Auriol. To Suárez, all must be evaluated as the manifestations of the rather uncreative approach which, passively copies a preconceived model (144). Even though, as Renemann rightly shows, John of St. Thomas affirms that the idea is the formal concept (as it is for Suárez), yet John rates the intellection (cognitive act) and its intramental product; that is, the mental word alias expressed species alias concept (*species expressa, conceptus*), as two really different “*res*”. Not only is this product really different from the mental act, it is also conceived by John as the *medium in quo*, in that one comes to know what it is to be imitated. It is just this objective preconception, for John implying the exercise of the extrinsic formal causality, not the efficient causality which regulates and directs the artistic production (81–84). Renemann shows that Suárez is of the different opinion.¹ The mental word is not distinct but really identical with the cognitive act. A concept is rendered not as the *medium in quo* but as the *medium quo*. The real identity between the entitative and representative aspect of the impressed and then expressed species is what prevents Suárez from accepting the claim that the genuine exemplar is to be taken as the extrinsic form.

Not only a Thomistic version of the preconception, but also a Scotistic position accepting the view that ideas are intramental objective concepts having their own diminutive being acquires negative assessment in Suárez. One of the main textual evidences in favour of the identification of the objective concept with the extramental thing (the realistic interpretation of the objective notion brought by the author) is found in *DM* 25, 1, 29. Here Suárez claims “*nam conceptus objectivus, si sit omnino proprius et adaequatus rei faciendae, non distinguitur ab ipsamet re; idem autem non est mensura suiipsius*”. The objective concept cannot be considered as the idea because it is an extramental thing itself. A produced (extramental) thing cannot be the cause of itself. That is why the objective concept cannot be considered as the idea. Only something that is different from a product, which is an intramental entity (the formal concept), can be adopted as the exemplar. The significant consequence of that claim for Suárez’s metaphysics is that the objective being, which is intramental, comes upon the tapis only in the case of formation of being of reason (*ens rationis*). The being of having purely the objective being in the mind requires in its intellectual production the reflective act. Without the act of reflection of a non-being as if it were being (105–107) something cannot be conceived as having the intramental objective being.²

¹ The same situation is for all other Jesuits mentioned in the book. As regards Hurtado de Mendoza, Arriaga, Oviedo, and Lynch see 79–80, 85–88, and 95–100.

² Renemann correctly points out that the act of reflexion is not sufficiently taken into account in the “Cartesian” interpretation of Norman J. Wells (113–117).

Having refused two main rival theories,³ Renemann comes to the rewarding comparison with William Ockham, which offers both the non-trivial agreements and disagreements. At first, he affirms the resemblance between them in the theory of cognition (namely with his late theory of *intellectio*). Both thinkers make allowances only for two ontological building-blocks in the exposition of cognition. They are (representative) mental acts (natural signs) and extramental things themselves.⁴ Despite that similarity, their theories differ from each other. In contrast to Suárez, Ockham focuses more on the issue of divine cognition and production. Only in that frame, where the main stress is laid on the attribute of divine simplicity, can be said that the ideas are the terminating objects, namely creatures themselves (49–55). That is denied by Suárez, not only in the case of the ideas in the human mind, but also in the divine mind.

Apart from the aforementioned merit of the book, the publication is not spared from its shortcomings. I would like to mention three.

(i) The book does not seem to be well-balanced. Though bearing Suárez in the title, almost two-thirds of Renemann's book attends the wide scope of other authors. As the more serious drawback I consider the disproportion in the thematical focus. Why does the significant part of the 4th chapter on Auriol (36–46) deal with the issue of universals? If it is because of the clarification of Auriol's theory of concept, why is the same not done in the part on Suárez? Moreover, in the passage on Auriol's theory of universals (44), the author presents a problematic statement. He says that, for Thomists the only foundation for the formation of universal concepts is a thing's operation, which is either false or, at least, is not true in all possible interpretations of Thomism. The given statement can be without any reservations ascribed to Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza, who tampers with the notion of extrinsic virtual distinction (*distinctio virtualis extrinseca*), not to Thomists explicitly endorsing the intrinsic virtual distinction (*distinctio virtualis intrinseca*).⁵ Even though Hurtado de Mendoza is convinced that he loyally interprets Aquinas, his interpretation can be easily refused.⁶ Moreover, I do not think that the author has managed satisfactorily to unify two strata present in the discussion of ideas. On one hand, it is said that the main goal of the book is realised on the plane of the artistic production (that is, what the author says is the important contribution to scholarship made by the book); on the other, significant parts of Renemann's exposition deals with the issue of divine ideas (see mainly the chapters on Ockham and Fonseca; 49–55, 59–78). If the context of divine intellection and production is relevant, why is more not said about Suárez's theory of divine ideas, possibles and eternal truths? Such an attempt, it is useless to say, would require much deeper and more extensive enquiry into Suárez's metaphysical system (at least *DM* 31f. would have to

³ In the same way as the doctrine of Scotists it is also the theory of Auriol, which is unambiguously refused by Suárez. In my review I leave to the experts in Scotus's philosophy to what degree Renemann's interpretation is right to Scotus. The fact remains that Mastrius exposes the objective concept as being intramental.

⁴ I leave aside the differences regarding Ockham's refusal of the intentional species and the ontological (non-) structuring of particulars.

⁵ See E. J. Bauer, *Thomistische Metaphysik an der alten Benediktineruniversität Salzburg. Darstellung und Interpretation einer philosophischen Schule des 17./18. Jahrhunderts*, Innsbruck/Wien 1996, 146–151.

⁶ See D. Heider, "Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza's (Mis)interpretation of Aquinas", in *Francisco Suárez and his Legacy. The Impact of Suárezian Metaphysics and Epistemology on Modern Philosophy*, ed. Marco Sgarbi, Milano 2010, 105–140.

be taken significantly into account) than was done by the author in the rather narrow scope of *DM* 25.

(ii) The author often refers to his “secret sources”. Whether they are email exchanges of views with renowned scholars, for example Russell Lance Friedman (notes 111, 116) and Jacob Schmutz (notes 378–382, 384 f., 387–388, 392, 398, 475), or unpublished papers (Tiziana Suarez-Nani: note 122) and lectures (Wolfgang Hübener: note 417). Especially in one case that obstacle to consult a referenced text equals to the significant disadvantage for a reader’s understanding. It is Jacob Schmutz’s paper “La migration des concepts. La distinction entre concept formel et concept objectif au croisement des scolastiques parisienne et espagnole”, delivered as early as 2001, in which the foremost expert on the second scholasticism comes with a different exposition of Suárez’s objective concept of being (its ontological status is identified with Scotistic diminutive being). Unfortunately the fact remains that, since 2001, the paper has not been published. The question is why. One can surmise that the reason might be, among others, the author’s later critical reflections or even disagreement with the interpretation of his youth.

(iii) One of the main “Fragestellungen” of the book is how the mental or something in the mind can leave the mind and be manifested in the extramental reality (body, 1–2). The answer is that it is by means of the formal concept is seen as the *acies mentis* (*Blick des Geistes*). The answer to this, in principle, “mind–body question” is presented in the context of Suárez’s epistemology. What are missing are the psychological assumptions of Suárez’s epistemology. The psychological (anthropological) context connected with the relationship of the soul, powers and acts, which can be found apart from the introductory disputations of *De anima* also in *DM* 15, creates the important background for Suárez’s epistemology. In my opinion, it is difficult to answer the aforementioned question without explicit reference to the theory of “sympathy of potencies” rooted in the same (unique) soul. As is very well known among Suarezian researchers, that theory constitutes the important *explanans* of how the sensible particulars and material images (*phantasmata*) concur with the immaterial intellect in the production of the intellectual acts. By the perception of singulars, the intellect, rooted in the same (attentive) soul as the sensory powers, comes to the cognition of material singulars. Accordingly, no alteration in the representations of sensible and intelligible species can in fact take place. The direct *cognitio singularis* by means of the proper and distinct species is also open for intellect. The same theory is also crucial for the explanation of the opposite “transfer” concerning the agency of the practical intellect from the concept to extramental reality. It is the substantial attention of the soul (*attentio substantialis*), which is the manifestation of the basic rootedness of powers in the common soul, which is the main *explanans* of the aforementioned “mind–body” *explanandum*. It is to the detriment of the overall understanding of Suárez’s conception of ideas that the author does not take that theory into account, which is also confirmed by his disregard for the secondary sources dealing with that theory.⁷

⁷ Above all it is the classical book by J. Ludwig, *Das akausale Zusammenwirken (sympathia) der Seelenvermögen in der Erkenntnislehre des Suarez* (München 1929), but also Walter Hoeres, “Bewußtsein und Erkenntnisbild bei Suárez” (*Scholastik* XXXVI, 1961, 192–216). Speaking about the secondary literature, also the absence of the classical title Josef Müller, *Die Lehre vom verbum mentis in der spanischen Scholastik* (Münster 1968), the substantial part of which is devoted to Suárez, comes as surprising.

Notwithstanding the critical remarks, I consider Renemann's book as a good contribution to the contemporary "Suárez Forschung" which, starting from the context of ideas, confirms some well-established views about Suárez's metaphysics and epistemology. The emphasis on the efficient causality of ideas can be regarded as the manifestation of the tendency to give efficient causality the privileged place among other causes. The cognitive activism of Suárez's epistemology represents the pointed separation from the cognitive passivism of the epistemology of the Aristotle-Thomistic provenance. On the other hand, no less important, Renemann's book helps us to unbuild some evaluative stereotypes, out of which the cliché that especially Suárez's positively influenced Descartes's theory of *realitas objectiva* stands out.⁸

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Lawrence Nolan (ed.), *Primary and Secondary Qualities. The Historical and Ongoing Debate*. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011, 404 pp.

The distinction between primary and secondary qualities is famous and familiar from every course on the history of philosophy. In particular, no student of early modern philosophy can avoid the discussion about these two classes. The very nature of the distinction, however, is problematic, as the classical authors were led to it by very different considerations and were inclined to develop it in different ways as a part of their own philosophy. It has become evident that the distinction is in a crossing-point of the purposes of epistemology, philosophy of mind, and metaphysics. Moreover, it must be kept in mind that the same issues are fully alive in contemporary philosophy, although not always expressed in the same way.

Thus, the problem of primary and secondary qualities is a capital subject, but it has not received any systematic general exposition for a long time. Likewise, a look at philosophical encyclopaedias shows that articles about this distinction are often especially obscure. Therefore, a modern comprehensive anthology like the one now edited by Lawrence Nolan is highly welcome. *Primary and Secondary Qualities* includes fourteen essays, which investigate the fates of these issues in historical order, from ancient times to contemporary debate.

The editorial policy in an anthology like this is always a problematic matter. Should the book mainly contain enlightening general descriptions of the thought of various philosophers, or detailed inquiry of particular controversial issues? Should it be more like an overall picture of the whole field, or a collection of unconnected articles? Considering that this is the only account of its subject, a work that will surely serve as a handbook, I would prefer the former alternatives, and in these respects, the book is somewhat uneven. It begins with a short introduction which emphasizes a central theme of the book: the complexity of the distinction. This opens the way to the essays. For simplicity, the articles may be divided in four groups: ancient philosophy, seventeenth-century rationalism, classical empiricism, and after.

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The first section includes two chapters. Mi-Kyoung Lee writes about the distinction in ancient Greek philosophy. It has become customary to say that the modern distinction goes back to Democritus. She points out that the matter is more complex, because Democritus was simultaneously concerned in separating the properties of atoms from the properties of aggregates. But she prefers the reading that in the famous passages Democritus especially wants to prove the insufficiency of the senses: sensory qualities are not really informative. The account of Democritus' theory and also of his ancient critics makes clear that several themes that reappear later in the book indeed were anticipated. Greek philosophy also gave the outlines for some alternative answers: as Lee describes, it created the strategy that "secondary qualities" are derivative and yet real. Thus, Aristotle said that sensible qualities are entirely real and causally efficacious. Epicurus, though an atomist like Democritus, taught that sensational and other relational qualities can be real. Modern debates get a proper ancient background in this paper.

In his article about scholastic properties, Robert Pasnau observes that "there is almost no literature on Scholastic theories of the primary and secondary qualities" (41). Indeed, it seems to have been an almost universal principle that the four Aristotelian basic qualities (hot, cold, wet, dry) are primary, and secondary qualities result from their combinations, changing in accordance to their changes. However, as Pasnau makes clear, though the idea of primary qualities was prominent, its content must not be identified with the modern idea. In the latter half of his article, Pasnau aims to correct some misconceptions about medieval theory of perception, but he develops these issues in a rather speculative manner.

The next section contains two essays on Descartes and one on Gassendi. The papers "Gassendi and the Seventeenth-Century Atomists on Primary and Secondary Qualities" by Antonia LoLordo and "Sensible Qualities and Material Bodies in Descartes and Boyle" by Lisa Downing are exemplary in clarity. First, LoLordo shows that this is one of the many questions where Gassendi's philosophy is more original than was earlier assumed. His atomism led him to give an exceptional model of the qualities of macroscopic bodies in general: according to him, they are neither "in the mind", nor "in the bodies" as such, but they are modes or "textures" which result from the organization and interaction of atoms. Such an approach implies that there is no fundamental metaphysical distinction between primary and secondary qualities of bodies, though he admits the epistemic point that in order to identify secondary qualities we must refer to sensations. Their real nature, however, is not evident. LoLordo's arguments are highly enlightening, and they make one suspect that present-day scientific realists could find something rewarding in Gassendi.

Descartes famously claimed that sensible qualities cannot be really attributed to bodies. In her article, Downing calls attention to the startling fact that the reasons for this thesis are nowhere really explained. One simple argument is Ockham's razor, but something more would be needed. Downing goes carefully through all passages, mainly in the *Principia*, which could help here, and finds some clues. Descartes seems to assert that it is impossible to understand sensible qualities, in contrast to geometric ones, as belonging to bodies. But the explanation is still problematic. Downing asks: "Why can't I conceive of red bodies?" She finds three possible answers: (1) sensible ideas are pure *qualia*; (2) all properties must fit into the mechanist framework; or (3) the essence of bodies is purely extensional and excludes sensible properties. She comes to the conclusion that the essentialist answer (3) is the most promising alternative, but still not satisfactory, as it has no obvious motive. Downing's discussion is very acute, though it must be kept in mind, of course, that there is plenty of inquiry concerning these problems. An especially valuable paragraph in the article is the description of the more modest account of primary and secondary qualities which Robert Boyle created within his scientific corpuscularianism.

Lawrence Nolan's own paper, "Descartes on 'What We Call Color'", is an attempt to solve the problem of the status of Cartesian secondary qualities like colours. Nolan challenges the familiar interpretations that they are either merely subjective, or dispositions, or microphysical properties. His argument is based on the fact that Descartes very often speaks of "what we call colour", instead of just colour. "The point of this locution, I have argued, is to refer to the causes of our sensations in a metaphysically neutral manner" (106). (Somewhat confusingly, Nolan wants also to call colours *names* of these causes.) Colours are introduced because of false judgements, and they have no natural being, neither objective nor subjective. Quoting some less noticed Cartesian passages, Nolan makes an interesting suggestion in a controversial matter, but undoubtedly the issue remains open even after this complicated paper.

The next section of the book is the largest one: it contains six papers that are related to the British empiricism, the most famous phase in the debate concerning primary and secondary qualities. The first of them has an ambitious title, "Primary and Secondary Qualities in Locke's *Essay*", and the author is a recognized authority in Locke studies, Michael Ayers. He manages to create a concise and intelligible picture of the main ideas of Locke's arguments in this respect. He observes that the famous chapter II.8 of the *Essay* is ambiguous, and selects the central interpretational problems on this basis. Instead of getting lost to details, Ayers concentrates on a couple of fundamental issues. One of them is whether Locke's distinction was an outcome of his corpuscularianism, that is, whether it reflected a view concerning microphysical particles. As Ayers sees it, it is more fruitful to see the corpuscularianism, not as an ordinary physical theory, but as a result of a natural way of considering permanent objects: this is how the fundamental, primary qualities are given. Secondary qualities are then defined in contrast to the permanent ones. Furthermore, the Lockean ideas have their causes in the properties of the objects; the causes of the secondary qualities are powers of the objects. There is a tension in that Locke clearly states that there is no resemblance between ideas and objects, but on the other hand, the ideas represent their objects because of the causal origin. The interpretation of Locke's view has long been controversial, and Ayers offers a lucid novel account, where he also admits that Locke's model probably was not sufficient to explain the intentionality of ideas.

Also Edwin McCann's "Locke's Distinction: Primary Primary Qualities and Secondary Primary Qualities" takes Locke to give "a natural history of human understanding", though he interprets it perhaps more mechanistically than Ayers. "Primary primary qualities" qualify even insensibly small particles or parts of matter, and secondary primary qualities qualify sensible bodies. The crucial difference is simply in magnitude. As McCann shows, it turns out that Locke's argument is mainly concerned with the primary primary qualities. According to Locke, the connection between primary and secondary primary qualities is intelligible, whereas the step to secondary qualities must remain mysterious. (Locke specialists must be grateful of McCann's detailed analysis of the numerous strange changes that Locke made between different editions in the explanation of secondary qualities.) Primary and secondary qualities in ideas are related, respectively, to qualities and powers in objects. Locke's final result is that a scholastic doctrine of real qualities is not plausible and that corpuscularianism is a better explanation.

Leibniz's metaphysics obviously required a wholly different view of substances and qualities, but nevertheless, the primary and secondary qualities have a place in his system. In the paper "Primary and Secondary Qualities in the Phenomenalist Theory of Leibniz", Martha Brandt Bolton first observes that Leibniz had to reinterpret these qualities because he understood the material world phenomenally. The contrast between the two kinds derives from the degrees of cognition: intelligible qualities are primary, and purely sensible qualities are secondary. An interesting point here is that there is no difference in their ontological status. Leib-

niz's characteristic thesis is that the perception of secondary sensible qualities is extremely *confused*. Primary qualities, on the other hand, are common to several senses and have some organization and clarity in them. Therefore, they can also be used in physics and scientific laws. But Bolton shows how Leibniz reached this ordinary result of the mechanists via profoundly different courses.

The paper by Alan Nelson and David Landy is titled "Qualities and Simple Ideas: Hume and his Debt to Berkeley", though it says rather little about Berkeley. Locke had framed the correspondence between qualities of objects and simple ideas, and Berkeley criticized his model. Hume continues their theme with his discussion on simple and complex ideas. Nelson and Landy sketch a model of a way in which more and more complex ideas could be construed on Humean premises. This paper has comparatively little relevance to the main issue of the book.

Kenneth Winkler's "Hume and the Sensible Qualities" is extremely rich in ideas. He begins with an insightful survey of the roles of "secondary" and "sensible" before Hume. Secondary quality often meant a causally (or mechanically) derivative quality in an object, whereas sensible quality was a manifest sensory quality. Then it is a radical thesis to claim that all sensible qualities are secondary. Winkler draws an exciting picture of the position of Hume in this historical context. According to Hume, the main support of what he calls "modern philosophy" is the relativity of perceptions, but it is not clear what relativity exactly means here and to what extent he wants to connect this to the secondary status of sensible qualities. And if the relative sensible qualities are subjective, it ought to be decided what "objective" means. Hume's arguments in the *Treatise* and in the *Enquiry* are considerably different here. There seems to be vacillation between two different notions of objectivity of a quality: its causal relevance and its necessary occurrence in existing bodies. Winkler concludes that Hume's opinions lead to a conflict that allows no satisfactory solution. Winkler's arguments open an issue that definitely deserves further study.

Thomas Reid's way of handling the distinction was in many ways original. In "Reid on the Real Foundation of the Primary-Secondary Quality Distinction", James Van Cleve wants, in the first place, to show that, according to Reid, secondary qualities are metaphysically real and not reducible to primary qualities. This he does by arguing that secondary qualities in objects are dispositions and not their primary causal bases. The question has caused some debate among interpreters, and one might wish for greater clarity concerning the nature of these dispositions. The epistemological difference is that only the notion of primary qualities is "direct and distinct". Van Cleve's essay differs from the others in that he compares Reid to the views of several twentieth-century philosophers and finds some useful contrasts.

Gary Hatfield's paper "Kant and Helmholtz on Primary and Secondary Qualities" represents the development after the British empiricism. He begins with a comparison of pre-critical and critical Kant. In his early works, Kant seems to have accepted a realistic and relational account of spatial qualities, but his critical philosophy leads him to regard even the spatial qualities as phenomenal. Hence primary and secondary qualities are in the same position. The great physiologist and physicist Helmholtz is Hatfield's example of the nineteenth-century thinkers who struggled with the questions that Kant had aroused. Helmholtz experimented with several different versions of the subjectivity of perceptions. He first assumed it of secondary qualities, but later he felt that he was compelled to extend the subjectivity even to primary qualities. In this connection he attempts to develop an interesting idea where objects are postulated so that their structures explain the structures of the sensations; there obtains an abstract correspondence between the two, though the things in themselves are unknown. The primary qualities can be "images" by means of this abstract correspondence, secondary ones are only "signs".

The two last chapters are somewhat problematic. They are exclusively concerned with colours, and the discussion is not historical. First, Alex Byrne and David Hilbert in “Are Colors Secondary Qualities?” study the so-called dispositionalist analysis of colours, that is, the view that the redness of an object is its disposition to look red. The analysis has been subject to a number of criticisms, and the central aim of Byrne and Hilbert is to consider these criticisms. For instance the best-known criticism, that of circularity, is not valid for them, but the crucial fault is in the “natural sign theory”: the thought that the colours and other perceptual properties of objects are known by means of figuring out the properties of sensations, their natural signs. Byrne and Hilbert argue that the colours of objects can instead be known directly. Then, Barry Maund in “Colour Eliminativism” advocates a militant position which wants to eliminate colours from physical objects altogether. (He admits that colour predicates can be admissible and useful in a fictionalist manner.) The main reason here is the belief that colour qualities must satisfy certain systematic conditions which are not acceptable for ordinary physical qualities. He ends by sketching an alternative picture of the phenomenal colour experience.

These two papers are almost completely connected to recent or present controversies, and they, especially Maund, are rather strongly bound to definite opinions in the debated questions. Moreover, colour is renowned as a particular case of secondary quality which has quite a lot of its special problems and also an abundant history of discussion during centuries. It has also provoked a number of suggestions in the twentieth century. It might have benefited a larger public to provide just an outline of the history of colour and a survey of the alternatives in the debates today. But questions like this are, of course, matters of taste.

Probably it is unavoidable that some important topics are missing: for instance, Sir Isaac Newton himself is bypassed. Also the French sensationalism would be an interesting and insufficiently known field. But anyway, a few general features in the history of the whole philosophical discussion of primary and secondary qualities call attention in the papers. For instance, philosophers have apparently neglected the aspect that has been especially prominent for scientists, that is, the publicity and measurability of primary qualities. The contacts between philosophy and natural science have been thin. The book makes also convincingly clear that the terms “primary” and “secondary” have been used in numerous different senses. The volume ends with a valuable bibliography of secondary literature, which “aims toward a comprehensive list” (though it includes only texts in English).

To sum up, this collection is a highly welcome addition to historical literature and will certainly serve as an important source to those who have to study the development of these issues. The nature and aims of the individual essays naturally vary, as has perhaps become clear above. However, some of them – like those of Lee, LoLordo, Downing, Ayers, or Winkler – are excellent, and the whole book is truly an informative contribution concerning a central subject.

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