Glaucon is Convinced

⊕    “Now we have already described the man corresponding to aristocracy or the government of the best, whom we rightly say to be good and just.
   We have.
   Must we not, then, next after this, survey the inferior types, the man who is contentious and covetous of honor, corresponding to the Laconian [or: Spartan] constitution, and the oligarchical man in turn, and the democratic and the tyrant, in order that, after observing the most unjust of all, we may oppose him to the most just, and complete our inquiry as to the relation of pure justice and pure injustice in respect of the happiness and unhappiness of the possessor, so that we may either follow the counsel of Thrasymachus and pursue injustice or the present argument and pursue justice?
   Assuredly, Socrates" (Republic VIII.544e).


The cities and corresponding men:

1. "aristocracy" (ἀριστοκρατία).
In the aristocrat, the best part (reason) rules.

2. "timocracy or timarchy" (τιμοκρατία ἢ τιμαρχία).
In the timocrat, the part covetous of honor (spirit) rules.

3. "oligarchy" (ὀλιγαρχία).
The oligarch desires wealth and arranges his life to get it.

4. "democracy" (δημοκρατία).
In the democrat, all pleasures are equal (Republic VIII.561b).

5. The city ruled by a tyrant.
In the tyrant, the lawless desires rule (Republic VIII.571b).











  "And in order not to argue in the dark, shall we first define our distinction between necessary and unnecessary appetites?
  Let us do so.
  Well, then, desires that we cannot divert or suppress may be properly called necessary, and likewise those whose satisfaction is beneficial to us, may they not? For our nature compels us to seek their satisfaction. Is not that so?
  Most assuredly.
  Then we shall rightly use the word necessary of them?
  Rightly.
  And what of the desires from which a man could free himself by discipline from youth up, and whose presence in the soul does no good and in some cases harm? Should we not fairly call all such unnecessary?
  Fairly indeed" (Republic VIII.558d).   "[S]o do you declare who in your opinion is first in happiness and who second, and similarly judge the others, all five in succession, the royal, the timocratic, the oligarchic, the democratic, and the tyrannical man.
  The decision is easy. For as if they were choruses I judge them in the order of their entrance, and so rank them in respect of virtue and vice, happiness and its contrary.
  Shall we hire a herald, then, or shall I myself make proclamation that the son of Ariston pronounced the best man and the most just to be the happiest (εὐδαιμονέστατον), and that he is the most kingly, the one who most rules like a king over himself; and declared that the worst and most unjust is the most unhappy, and that he is the most tyrannical, the one who is most a tyrant over himself and the city he rules?
  Let it have been so proclaimed.
  Shall I add the clause ‘alike whether their character is known to all men and gods or is not known’?
  Add that to the proclamation.
  Very good, this, then, would be one of our proofs" (Republic IX.580b).

The "proclamation" is that those whose souls are just are happier than those whose souls are unjust and that this does not depend on external rewards or punishments.

Glaucon is convinced, but it is hard to see why.

In Book II, Glaucon he was not convinced. He repeated the story of the Ring of Gyges to illustrate the common view that sometimes it is to our advantage to be unjust, and he and Adeimantus challenged Socrates to show them that this common view is false.

To meet this challenge, Socrates described justice in the city and in an individual.

In an individual human being, justice is an arrangement of the parts of the soul so that each does its own job. Reason, in the just soul, knows what is good and what is bad and directs action in terms of this knowledge. Spirit is reason's ally. Together, they hold appetite in check.

After Socrates gives this description of justice in an individual, Glaucon says that argument to show the just are happier is unnecessary. He thinks that because that life with a body ruined by disease is not worth living, the same is clearly true for life with a soul ruined by injustice.

⊕
"Among unnecessary pleasures and appetites, some seem lawless. These are probably present in all of us, but they are held in check by the laws and by our better desires allied with reason. In a few people they have been eliminated entirely or only a few weak ones remain, while in others they are stronger and more numerous" (Republic IX.571b).







"For how can a man be happy (εὐδαίμων) if he is a slave to anybody at all? No, natural fairness and justice, I [Callicles] tell you [Socrates] now quite frankly, is this—that man who would live rightly should let his desires be as strong as possible and not chasten them, and should be able to minister to them when they are at their height by reason of his manliness and intelligence, and satisfy each appetite in turn with what it desires. ... No, in good truth, Socrates—which you claim to be seeking—the fact is this: luxury and licentiousness and freedom, if they have the support of force, are virtue and happiness, and the rest of these embellishments—the unnatural covenants of mankind—are all mere stuff and nonsense" (Gorgias 491e). "I think that from this point on, Socrates, our inquiry becomes an absurdity—if, while life is thought to be intolerable with a ruined constitution of body even if accompanied by all the food and drink and wealth and power in the world, yet we are to inquire whether life is going to be worth living when our soul, the very thing by which we live, is in turmoil and ruined, but one can do as he pleases, but cannot do that which will rid him of badness and injustice and make him possessed of justice and virtue" (Republic IV.444e).

Why does Glaucon think that life with a body ruined by disease is not worth living?

He does not say, at least not explicitly, but maybe he thinks that "a ruined constitution of body" prevents one from living the life he wants to live. The person has the means to get the fancy foods and other things that figure in extravagant lives. The problem is that he cannot enjoy them because his body does not allow him to engage in the required actions.

This sort of powerlessness seems to fit with the subsequent explanation for why the tyrant (the worst of the four unjust individuals) is the most unjust and thus the least happy.

⊕   "Again, does not the enslaved and tyrannized city least of all do what it wishes?
  Decidedly so, Socrates.
  Then the tyrannized soul—to speak of the soul as a whole—will least of all do what it wishes, but being always forcibly dragged by the stings of a gadfly [the appetite], it will be full of disorder and regret.
  Of course" (Republic IX.577d).

The plight of the "tyrannized soul," however, is not the plight of all unjust souls.

There are two ways for a soul to be unjust. Reason might rule but the soul be unjust because reason has a false belief about what is good. In such an unjust soul, nothing internal interferes. The nonrational parts do not "drag" the soul against "what it wishes."

It is true that this unjust soul we are contemplating has a false belief about what is good. If he satsifies desires that depend on this belief, he gets something that does not benefit him.

No just soul in this way gets something that does not benefit him, but this does not seem enough to show that every just soul is happier than every unjust soul.