Epicurus and the Epicureans

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⊕ Cicero (106-43 BCE) also discusses Epicurus and the Epicureans in several works. His discussions are often polemical. What is now known about Epicurus (341-270 BCE) depends primarily on three letters Diogenes Laertius (3rd century CE) preserves in Book X of his Lives of the Philosophers:

• Letter to Herodotus
• Letter to Pythocles
• Letter to Menoeceus

Life of Epicurus. Lives of the Philosophers X.1-33. Excerpts.

Here DL (Diogenes Laertius ) is reporting what Epicurus thought. The three letters come after these reports.

• Lives of the Philosophers X.31

⊕ "[T]hey will not get Epicurus, who despises and laughs at the whole of dialectic" (Cicero, Academica II.97).

"Take next the second main area of philosophy, the study of inquiry and argument known as logic (λογική). As far as I can gather, your master is quite defenseless and destitute here. He abolishes definition, and teaches nothing about division and classification. He hands down no system for conducting and concluding arguments; he gives no method for dealing with sophisms, or for disentangling ambiguities." (Cicero, On Ends I.22). They reject dialectic as superfluous.

Notes on the Text

This is part of Epicurus's epistemology. Dialectic first referred to the kind of argument Socrates pressed against his interlocutors, but it came to be used for logic more generally.

• Lives of the Philosophers X.31

⊕ Epicurus affirms that our perceptions, preconceptions, and passions are the criteria of truth.

Notes on the Text

The "criteria of truth" (κριτήρια τῆς ἀληθείας) are what the school relies on to make its judgments.

• Lives of the Philosophers X.31

⊕ [Nothing can] refute perceptions or convict them of error: one cannot convict another and kindred perception, for they are equally valid.... [N]or again can reason refute them, for reason is wholly dependent on perceptions.

Notes on the Text

This can confusing. The idea is that perceptions are different from beliefs. Perceptions are always true. Beliefs are not. What we take to be false perceptions are really false beliefs that arise in us when we have these perceptions.

• Lives of the Philosophers X.33

⊕ "Epicurus perceived, that the gods exist, because nature herself has imprinted a conception of them on the minds of all mankind. .... Such notions he called a πρóληψιν, that is, a conception of an object previously grasped, without which nothing can be understood or investigated or discussed" (Cicero, On the Nature of Gods I.16). By preconception they mean a cognition or a right opinion or notion, or universal idea stored in the mind; that is, a recollection of an external object often presented, for example, that such and such a thing is a man.

Notes on the Text

Epicurus thinks that human beings naturally develop "preconceptions" (προλήψεις) from perceptions in something like the process of induction that Aristotle describes.

• Lives of the Philosophers X.34

⊕ "We are inquiring, then, what is the final and ultimate good, which as all philosophers are agreed must be of such a nature as to be the end to which all other things are means, while it is not itself a means to anything else. This Epicurus finds in pleasure; pleasure he holds to be the chief good, pain the chief evil. This he sets out to prove as follows: Every animal, as soon as it is born, seeks for pleasure, and delights in it as the chief good, while it recoils from pain as the chief evil, and so far as possible avoids it. This it does as long as it remains unperverted, at the prompting of nature's own unbiased and honest verdict. Hence Epicurus refuses to admit any necessity for argument or discussion to prove that pleasure is desirable and pain to be avoided. These facts, he thinks, are perceived by the senses, as that fire is hot, snow white, honey sweet, none of which things need be proved by elaborate argument: it is enough merely to draw attention to them" (Cicero, On Ends I.29). They affirm that there are two passions, pleasure and pain, which arise in all animals, and that the one is favourable and the other hostile to that being, and by their means choice and avoidance are distinguished.

Notes on the Text

Pleasure and pain are the good and the bad.

Letter to Herodotus. Lives of the Philosophers X.34-83. Excerpts.

• Lives of the Philosophers X. 35

For those who are unable to study carefully all my physical writings or to go into the longer treatises at all, I have myself prepared an epitome of the whole system, Herodotus, to preserve in the memory enough of the principal doctrines, to the end that on every occasion they may be able to aid themselves on the most important points, so far as they take up the study of physics. Those who have made some advance in the survey of the entire system ought to fix in their memories (μνήμην) under the principal headings an ⊕ "When I was young, Cebes, I was tremendously eager for the kind of wisdom which they call investigation of nature. I thought it was a glorious thing to know the causes of everything, why each thing comes into being and why it perishes and why it exists; and I was always unsettling myself with such questions as these: Do heat and cold, by a sort of fermentation, bring about the organization of animals, as some people say? Is it the blood, or air, or fire by which we think (φρονοῦμεν)? Or is it none of these, and does the brain furnish the sensations of hearing and sight and smell, and do memory (μνήμη) and opinion (δόξα) arise from these, and does knowledge (ἐπιστήμην) come from memory and opinion in a state of rest? And again I tried to find out how these things perish, and I investigated the phenomena of heaven and earth until finally I made up my mind that I was by nature totally unfitted for this kind of investigation" (Phaedo 96a). elementary outline of the whole treatment of the subject. For a comprehensive view is often required, the details but seldom. To the former, then--the main heads--we must continually return, and must memorize them so far as to get a valid conception of the facts, as well as the means of discovering all the details exactly when once the general outlines are rightly understood and remembered.... [S]ince such a course is of service to all who take up physics, I recommend constant activity in the inquiry; and with this sort of activity more than any other I bring calm to my life.

Notes on the Text

• Epicurus stresses memory in a way that suggests he is more allied with the empiricist tradition.

• Lives of the Philosophers X. 50

⊕ Falsehood and error always depend upon the intrusion of opinion... For the impressions which, e.g., are received in a picture or arise in dreams, or from any other form of apprehension by the mind or by the other criteria of truth, would never have resembled what we call the real and true things, had it not been for certain actual things of the kind with which we come in contact. Error would not have occurred, if we had not experienced some other movement in ourselves, conjoined with, but distinct from, the perception of what is presented. And from this movement, if it be not confirmed or be contradicted, falsehood results; while, if it be confirmed or not contradicted, truth results. And to this view we must closely adhere, if we are not to repudiate the criteria founded on the clear evidence of sense, nor again to throw all these things into confusion by maintaining falsehood as if it were truth.

Notes on the Text

We form false belief when we wrongly accept the thoughts that arise in our thinking.

• Lives of the Philosophers X. 78

⊕ "We must believe that in the sky revolutions, solstices, eclipses, risings and settings, and the like, take place without the ministration or command, either now or in the future, of any being who at the same time enjoys perfect bliss along with immortality. For troubles and anxieties and feelings of anger and partiality do not accord with bliss. ... [Thinking otherwise will] produce the worst disturbance (μέγιστον τάραχον) in our souls" (Lives of the Philosophers X. 76).

"In the first place, believe that, like everything else, knowledge of heavenly things, whether taken along with other things or in isolation, has no other end in view than peace of mind and firm conviction (ἀταραξίαν καὶ πίστιν βέβαιον), just as with the rest [of physics]" (Lives of the Philosophers X. 85).

"For should not do physics by following groundless postulates and stipulations, but follow the promptings of the facts; for our life has no need now of unreason and groundless opinion; our one need is to live without tumult" (Lives of the Philosophers X. 87). [W]e must hold that to arrive at accurate knowledge of the cause of the important things is the function of physics, and that happiness depends on this, and upon knowing what the heavenly things really are, and any kindred facts contributing to exact knowledge in this respect.

Notes on the Text

• Knowledge of physics is necessary for happiness. This, though, is not the view in Aristotle, for example, according to which happiness is contemplation. Epicurus thinks that knowledge of physics is necessary to rid ourselves of irrational fears. Human beings are subject to trying to understand natural phenomena in terms of the gods. They think that these phenomena indicate divine mood and that storms and other such phenomena are punishment from the gods. Knowledge of physics is necessary to dispel these irrational fears.

• Lives of the Philosophers X. 81

⊕ The "heavenly things" (τὰ μετέωρα) are the objects and phenomena in the sky, the celestial bodies and the atmospheric phenomena.

μετέωρα transliterates as meteōra and is the root of the first part of the English word 'meteorology.'

ἀταραξία [T]he greatest anxiety of the human soul arises through the belief that these things [heavenly bodies] are blessed and indestructible, and that at the same time they have volitions and actions and culpability inconsistent with this belief; and through expecting or apprehending something terrible and everlasting, either because of the myths, or because we are in dread of the mere insensibility of death, as if it had to do with us; and through being reduced to this state not by conviction but by a certain irrational suffering, so that, if men do not set bounds to their terror, they endure as much or even more intense anxiety than the man whose views on these matters are quite vague. But freedom from disturbance (ἀταραξία) means being released from all these troubles and having a remembrance of the highest and most important truths. Hence we must attend to present feelings and sense perceptions, whether those of mankind in general or those peculiar to the individual, and also attend to all the clear evidence available, as given by each of the standards of truth. For by heeding them we shall rightly trace to its cause and banish the source of disturbance and dread, accounting for celestial phenomena and for all other things which from time to time befall us and cause the utmost alarm to the rest of mankind.

Notes on the Text

• Happiness does not consist contemplation or any other particular activity. It is "freedom from disturbance."

Letter to Pythocles. Lives of the Philosophers X.83-116. Excerpts.

• Lives of the Philosophers X. 84

In your letter to me, of which Cleon was the bearer, you continue to show me affection which I have merited by my devotion to you, and you try, not without success, to recall the considerations which make for a happy life. To aid your memory you ask me for a clear and concise statement respecting heavenly things; for what we have written on this subject elsewhere is, you tell me, hard to remember, although you have my books constantly with you. I was glad to receive your request and am full of pleasant expectations. We will then complete our writing and grant all you ask. Many others besides you will find these reasonings useful, and especially those who have but recently made acquaintance with the true story of nature and those who are attached to pursuits which go deeper than any part of ordinary education. So take them well, and holding them in your memory, take them along with the short epitome in my letter to Herodotus.

• Lives of the Philosophers X. 116

All this, Pythocles, you should remember; for then you will escape a long way from myth.

Letter to Menoeceus. Lives of the Philosophers X.121-135. Excerpts.

• Lives of the Philosophers X. 124

⊕ "Accustom yourself to believe" (Συνέθιζε δὲ ἐν τῷ νομίζειν).

νομίζειν is an infinitive form of νομίζω, which means "to hold or own as a custom or usage, to use customarily, practise."

So Epicurus instructs Menoeceus to do something ("accustom himself") so that he no longer believes that death is bad.

This is a little puzzling.

It is natural to think beliefs are attitudes we adopt or reject on the basis of evidence. In this case, all we need to do to stop believing that death is bad is to conclude that the object of the belief ("death is bad") is false.

Epicurus, however, seems to think of "belief" differently. Accustom yourself to believe that death is nothing to us, for good and evil imply sentience, and death is the privation of all sentience; therefore a right understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable, not by adding to life an illimitable time, but by taking away the yearning after immortality. For life has no terrors for him who has thoroughly apprehended that there are no terrors for him in ceasing to live. Foolish, therefore, is the man who says that he fears death, not because it will pain when it comes, but because it pains in the prospect. Whatsoever causes no annoyance when it is present, causes only a groundless pain in the expectation. Death, therefore, the most awful of bad things, is nothing to us, seeing that, when we are, death is not come, and, when death is come, we are not. It is nothing, then, either to the living or to the dead, for with the living it is not and the dead exist no longer.

Notes on the Text

Epicurus has an argument that "death is nothing to us."

1.  Something is bad for us only if we suffer when it is true.
2.  The dead do not suffer (because they do not feel anything at all).
3.  If (1) and (2) are true, then death is "nothing to us."
----
4.  Death is "nothing to us."

The idea that drives the argument is that something is bad for us only it we suffer when it is true. So, since the dead do not suffer (because they feel no pleasure or pain), death is nothing to us.

• Lives of the Philosophers X.127

We must also reflect that of desires some are natural, others are groundless; and that of the natural some are necessary as well as natural, and some natural only. And of the necessary desires some are necessary if we are to be happy, some if the body is to be rid of uneasiness, some if we are even to live. He who has a clear and certain understanding of these things will direct every preference and aversion toward securing health of body and tranquillity (ἀταραξίαν) of soul , seeing that this is the sum and end of a blessed life. ⊕ For the end of all our actions is to be free from pain and fear, and, when once we have attained all this, the tempest of the soul is laid; seeing that the living creature has no need to go in search of something that is lacking, nor to look for anything else by which the good of the soul and of the body will be fulfilled. When we are pained because of the absence of pleasure, then, and then only, do we feel the need of pleasure. Wherefore we call pleasure the starting-point and goal of a blessed life. Pleasure is our first and kindred good. It is the starting-point of every choice and of every aversion, and to it we come back, inasmuch as we make feeling the rule by which to judge of every good thing.

Notes on the Text

ἀταραξία is formed from ἀ- ("lack") and τάραξις ("trouble, confusion, disorder").

Epicurus uses it to refer to the state in which everything in life is going perfectly. There is no worry in the mind. The things one likes happen. The things one dislikes do not happen.

• Lives of the Philosophers X.129

And since pleasure is our first and native good, for that reason we do not choose every pleasure whatsoever, but ofttimes pass over many pleasures when a greater annoyance ensues from them. And ofttimes we consider pains superior to pleasures when submission to the pains for a long time brings us as a consequence a greater pleasure. While therefore all pleasure because it is naturally akin to us is good, not all pleasure is choice worthy, just as all pain is bad and yet not all pain is to be shunned. It is, however, by measuring one against another, and by looking at the conveniences and inconveniences, that all these matters must be judged. Sometimes we treat the good as bad, and the bad, on the contrary, as good.

Notes on the Text

Pleasure and pain are the good and the bad, but this does not mean that you should choose every pleasure and avoid every pain. Some pleasurable experiences bring more pain than pleasure. Similarly, some painful experiences bring more pleasure than pain.

• Lives of the Philosophers X.131

When we say that pleasure is the end and aim, we do not mean the pleasures of the prodigal or the pleasures of sensuality, as we are understood to do by some.... By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul. It is not an unbroken succession of drinking-bouts and of revelry, not sexual love, not the enjoyment of the fish and other delicacies of a luxurious table, which produce a pleasant life; it is sober reasoning, searching out the grounds of every choice and avoidance, and banishing those beliefs through which the greatest tumult (θόρυβος) takes possession of the soul.

Notes on the Text

• Lives of the Philosophers X.133

Who is superior in his judgement to such a man? He holds a pious belief concerning the gods, and is altogether free from the fear of death. He has diligently considered the end fixed by nature, and understands how easily the limit of good things can be reached and attained, and how either the duration or the intensity of evils is but slight.

Notes on the Text

This is what became to be known as "four-fold remedy" (τετραφάρμακος): that God presents no fears, death presents no worries, good is readily attainable, and bad is readily avoidable.

• Lives of the Philosophers X.135

Exercise yourself in these and kindred precepts day and night, both by yourself and with those similar to you; then never, either in waking or in dream, will you be disturbed, but will live as a god among men.

Notes on the Text