SOCRATES

**** This page is under construction ****

The Love of Wisdom

Plato portrays Socrates as a "lover of wisdom" (φιλόσοφος).

⊕ φιλόσοφος transliterates as philosophos

φιλοσοφία transliterates as philosophia.

Some translations of Plato's dialogues use "philosopher" and "philosophy" to translate φιλόσοφος and φιλοσοφία, but this can be misleading given the current use of the words for certain academics and their academic discipline. Further, these translations can hide what Socrates is saying about himself when he calls himself a φιλόσοφος.


"You know Chaerephon, I fancy. He was my comrade from a youth and the comrade of your democratic party, and shared in the recent exile and came back with you. And you know the kind of man he was, how impetuous in whatever he undertook. Well, once he went to Delphi and made so bold as to ask the oracle this question; and, gentlemen, don't make a disturbance at what I say; for he asked if there were anyone wiser than I. Now the Pythia replied that there was no one wiser. And about these things his brother here will bear you witness, since Chaerephon is dead. But see why I say these things; for I am going to tell you whence the prejudice against me has arisen" (Apology 20e).

Delphi was the home of the Temple of Apollo. The Pythia is the name of the priestess who serves as oracle.

"From this investigation [of what the Pythia said], many enmities have arisen against me, and such as are most harsh and grievous, so that many prejudices have resulted from them and I am called a wise man. For on each occasion those who are present think I am wise in the matters in which I refute someone else" (Apology 22e).

"I am still even now going about and searching and investigating at the god's behest anyone, whether citizen or foreigner, who I think is wise; and when he does not seem so to me, I give aid to the god and show that this man is not wise. And by reason of this occupation I have no leisure to attend to any of the affairs of the state worth mentioning, or of my own, but am in vast poverty on account of my service to the god" (Apology 23b).


"refute" (ἐξελέγχω)

"investigate" (ζητέω) φιλόσοφος is a compound composed from φίλος ("lover") and σοφός ("wise"). The word is relatively rare before the time of Socrates, the construction itself was not. The lover of something arranges his life around this something. For Socrates, it was wisdom.

• Apology 21b

For when I heard this [from the Pythia, that no one is wiser than me], I thought to myself: 'What in the world does the god mean, and what riddle is he propounding? For I am conscious that I am not wise either much or little. What then does he mean by declaring that I am the wisest? He certainly cannot be lying, for that is not possible for him.' And for a long time I was at a loss as to what he meant; then with great reluctance I proceeded to investigate him somewhat as follows. I went to one of those who had a reputation for wisdom, thinking that there, if anywhere, I should prove the utterance wrong and should show the oracle that this man is wiser than I, but you said I was wisest. So examining this man—for I need not call him by name, but it was one of the public men with regard to whom I had this kind of experience, men of Athens—and conversing with him, this man seemed to me to seem to be wise to many other people and especially to himself, but not to be so.

Notes on the Text

The story Socrates tells here does not explain why Chaerephon and maybe some others thought that Socrates was wise. It explains why he goes around questioning the way he does.

In what he understands as service to the god, Socrates searched for someone with wisdom. Because he thought that he himself lacked wisdom, he needed a way to determine whether others had it. His method was to question them and to use their answers as premises in an argument for a conclusion they themselves thought was contrary to something they had said. If his interlocutors were refuted in this way, it seems that Socrates could conclude that they lacked wisdom and hence were not counterexamples to the oracle’s response.

It is worth thinking about this in a little more detail.

Socrates asks me a question. I give P as my answer. He asks more questions. I give Q, R, and S as my answers. He gets me to admit that these answers commit me to not-P.

Suppose that when I gave P as my answer, I thought I knew P.

Does the fact that Socrates refutes me show that I was wrong?

• Apology 29d

[I]f in reply you should say to me: Socrates, this time we will not do as Anytus [one of Socrates' accusers] says, but we will let you go, on this condition, however, that you no longer in this investigation spend time and not to love wisdom, ⊕ and if you are caught doing so again you shall die. If you should say this and let me go on this condition, I should say in reply to you that I respect and love you, but I shall obey the god rather than you, and while I live and am able to continue, I shall never give up the love of wisdom or stop exhorting you and demonstrating against any one of you whom I may meet, saying in my accustomed way: Most excellent man, are you who are a citizen of Athens, the greatest of cities and the most famous for wisdom and power, not ashamed to care for the acquisition of wealth and for reputation and honor, when you neither care nor take thought for wisdom and truth and your soul in such a manner that it is best? ⊕ And if any of you argues the point, and says he does care, I shall not let him go at once, nor shall I go away, but I shall question him, examine well and test, ⊕ "For if you put me to death, you will not easily find another, who, to use a rather absurd figure, attaches himself to the city as a gadfly to a horse, which, though large and well bred, is sluggish on account of his size and needs to be aroused by stinging. I think the god (ὁ θεὸς) fastened me upon the city in some such capacity, and I go about arousing, and urging and reproaching each one of you, constantly alighting upon you everywhere the whole day long. Such another is not likely to come to you, and if you take my advice, you will spare me. But you, perhaps, might be angry, like people awakened from a nap, and might slap me, as Anytus advises, and easily kill me; then [because you did not spare me] you would pass the rest of your lives in slumber, unless the god, in his care for you, should send someone else to sting you. And that I am, as I say, a kind of gift from the god, you might understand from this; for I have neglected all my own affairs and have been enduring the neglect of my concerns all these years, but I am always busy in your interest, coming to each one of you individually like a father or an elder brother and urging you to care for virtue" (Apology 30e).


"virtue" (ἀρετή)


"Since I take forethought over my life as a whole, I pay attention to these things" (Protagoras 361d). and if I find that he does not possess virtue, but says he does, I shall rebuke him for scorning the things that are of most importance and caring more for what is of less worth. This I shall do to whomever I meet, young and old, foreigner and citizen, but most to the citizens, inasmuch as you are more nearly related to me. For know that the god commands me to do this, and I believe that no greater good ever came to pass in the city than my service to the god. For I go about doing nothing else than urging you, young and old, not to care for your persons or your property more than for your souls such they are the best, or even so much; and I tell you that virtue does not come from money, but from virtue comes money and all other good things to man, both to the individual and to the state. If by saying these things I corrupt the youth, these things must be injurious; but if anyone asserts that I say other things than these, he says what is untrue. So I say to you, men of Athens, either do as Anytus tells you, or not, and either acquit me, or not, knowing that I shall not change my conduct even if I am to die many times over.

Notes on the Text

Socrates tells the jury that he will not give up the "love of wisdom" (φιλοσοφία) and that he will not stop exhorting and demonstrating against those he happens to meet.

This raises several questions.

What is the "love of wisdom" (φιλοσοφία)?
What is the wisdom Socrates exhorts his interlocutors to care about?
What is a soul and how is it connected to action?
What is a virtue?
What is the demonstrating against in which Socrates says he engages?

Answers to these questions will tell us a lot about how Plato understood the importance of the historical Socrates and the unusual life he lived in φιλοσοφία.

• Apology 21c

It was one of the public men with regard to whom I had this kind of experience, ⊕ "I am called a wise man. For on each occasion those who are present think I am wise in the matters in which I confute someone else; but the fact is, gentlemen, it is likely that the god is really wise and by his oracle means this: human wisdom is of little or no value" (Apology 23a). and conversing with him, this man seemed to me to seem to be wise to many other people and especially to himself, but not to be so; and then I tried to show him that he thought he was wise, but was not. As a result, I became hateful to him and to many of those present; and so, as I went away, I thought to myself, I am wiser than this man; for neither of us really knows anything fine and good, but this man thinks he knows something when he does not, whereas I, as I do not know anything, do not think I do either. I seem, then, in just this little thing to be wiser than this man at any rate, that what I do not know I do not think I know either.

Notes on the Text

Socrates thinks that his wisdom is "human wisdom" and that it is of "little or no value."

What is this human wisdom?

• Charmides 174a

⊕ "happy" (εὐδαίμων)













"good" (ἀγαθόν), "bad" (κακόν)







Critias would become a leading member of the "Thirty Tyrants" (Τριάκοντα Τύραννοι).   Which knowledge of his makes him happy? Or does he owe it to all of them alike?
  By no means all alike.
  But to which sort most? One that gives him knowledge of what thing, present, past or future? Is it that by which he knows draught-playing?
  Draught-playing indeed!
  Well, reckoning?
  By no means.
  Well, health?
  That knowledge contributes more than the others.
  And the knowledge that contributes the most is what?
  Of good and bad.
  You rogue. You have been dragging me around in circles, hiding the fact that [it is this knowledge of good and bad alone that makes] us do well and be happy. So if you take away this knowledge from the other knowledges, will medicine any the less give us health, or shoemaking give us shoes, or weaving provide clothes, or will the pilot's art any the less prevent the loss of life at sea, or the general's in war?
  None the less, Socrates.
  But, my dear Critias, to have any of these things well and beneficially done will be out of our reach if this [knowledge of good and bad] is lacking.
  True.

Notes on the Text

The dramatic date of the Charmides is 429 BCE, early in the Peloponnesian War. Socrates says that he has just yesterday evening returned with the army from the Battle of Potidaea.

The question in the dialogue is what "temperance" (σωφροσύνη) is.

Socrates gets Charmides to admit that knowledge of good and bad makes us "do well and be happy" because it governs the things the arts produce, such as health.

Socrates talks about things "things well and beneficially done."

We want to do this because we want to live what is traditionally called the good life. In Greek, someone living such a life is εὐδαίμων or "happy." What makes one life better than another is that it is more beneficial for whoever is living it. He gets something out of living the life. It makes him εὐδαίμων.

• Laches 194c

  Well, for some time I have been thinking, Socrates, that you two are not defining courage in the right way; for you are not acting upon an admirable remark which I have formerly heard you make.
What is that, Nicias?
⊕ "I say, Laches, that it [courage] is this—the knowledge of what is to be dreaded or dared, either in war or in anything else" (Laches 194e).

  "Now tell me, Nicias, or rather, tell us—for Laches and I are sharing the argument between us—do you say that courage is knowledge of what is to be dreaded or dared?
  I do, Socrates" (Laches 196c).

"knowledge" (ἐπιστήμῃ)   I have often heard you say, Socrates, that every man is good in that wherein he is wise, and bad in that wherein he is unlearned.
  Well, that is true, Nicias, I must say.
  And hence, if the brave man is good, clearly he must be wise.
  Do you hear him, Laches?
  I do, without understanding very well what he says.
  But I think I understand it: our friend appears to me to mean that courage is a kind of wisdom.

Notes on the Text

The dramatic date of the Laches is sometime before 418 BCE when Laches (an Athenian general) was killed in the Athenian defeat at the Battle of Mantinea.

In the dialogue, the question is what "courage" (ἀνδρεία) is.

• Laches 197e

  Now, Nicias, please go back to the beginning and answer us: you know we started our discussion by considering courage as a part of virtue?
⊕ "virtue" (ἀρετὴ)   Quite so, Socrates.
  And you joined in this answer,—that it is a part, there being also other parts, which taken all together have received the name of virtue.
  Why, of course.
  Now, do you mean the same as I do by these? Besides courage, I refer to temperance, justice, and other similar things. And you also, do you not?
  Certainly I do.

Notes on the Text

⊕ • Laches 199d

⊕   Now do you think, my excellent friend, there could be anything wanting to the virtue of a man who knew all good things, and all about their production in the present, the future, and the past, and all about bad things likewise? Do you suppose that such a man could be lacking in temperance, or justice, and holiness, when he alone has the gift of taking due precaution, in his dealings with gods and men, as regards what is to be dreaded and what is not, and of procuring good things, owing to his knowledge of the right behavior towards them?
  I think, Socrates, there is something in what you say.
  Hence what you now describe, Nicias, will be not a part but the whole of virtue.
  Apparently, Socrates.

Notes on the Text

• Protagoras 360c ⊕



ἀμαθία "ignorance"

  And were not cowards found to be cowards through ignorance of what is dreadful?
  Certainly.
  And so they are cowards because of that ignorance?
  Yes.
  And the cause of their being cowards is admitted by you to be cowardice?
  Yes.
  Then ignorance of what is dreadful and not dreadful will be cowardice?
  Yes.
  But surely courage, is the opposite of cowardice.
  Yes.
  Then the wisdom that knows what is and what is not dreadful is opposed to the ignorance of these things?
  Yes.
  And the ignorance of them is cowardice?
  Yes.
  So the wisdom that knows what is and what is not dreadful is courage, being opposed to the ignorance of these things? Why is it, Protagoras, that you neither affirm nor deny what I ask you?
  Finish it, Socrates, by yourself.

Notes on the Text

In the Protagoras, Socrates recounts his conversation the night before with Protagoras.

Protagoras has said that "justice, temperance, holiness and the rest" are parts of virtue (Protagoras 329c). Socrates questions him about this understanding of virtue.

• Euthydemus 281a

⊕   Then similarly, I went on, in the use of the goods we mentioned at first—wealth and health and beauty—was it knowledge that showed the way to the right use of all those advantages and rectified their conduct, or was it something else?
  Knowledge, Socrates.
  So that knowledge, it would seem, supplies mankind not only with good luck, but with welfare, in all that he either possesses or conducts.
  Yes.
  Then can we, in name of Zeus, get any benefit from all the other possessions without understanding and wisdom? ... To sum up then, Cleinias, it seems that, as regards the whole lot of things which at first we termed goods, the discussion they demand is not on the question of how they are in themselves and by nature goods, but rather, I conceive, as follows: if they are guided by ignorance, they are greater evils than their opposites, according as they are more capable of ministering to their evil guide; whereas if understanding and wisdom guide them, they are greater goods; but in themselves neither sort is of any worth.
   I think the case appears to be as you suggest, Socrates.
⊕ ἡ μὲν σοφία ἀγαθόν, ἡ δὲ ἀμαθία κακόν,
"wisdom is good and ignorance bad"    Now what result do we get from our statements? Is it not precisely that, of all the other things, not one is either good or bad, but of these two, wisdom is good and ignorance bad?
   Yes.
   Let us consider then, the further conclusion that lies before us. Since we are all eager to be happy, and since we were found to become so by not only using things but using them aright, while knowledge, we saw, was that which provided the rightness and good fortune, it seems that every man must prepare himself by all available means so that he may be as wise as possible. Is it not so?
   Yes, Socrates.

Notes on the Text

The Euthydemus begins with Crito asking Socrates to identify the person to whom he was talking with in the Lyceum the other day. Socrates says that it was Euthydemus and that he invited Euthydemus and his brother Dionysodorus to question Cleinias.

In this questioning, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus make a sport of having Cleinias contradict himself. Socrates intervenes to show how he thinks "a display of exhorting this youth as to how he should devote himself to wisdom and virtue" should proceed (Euthydemus 278d).

• Gorgias 510d

   Hence if one of the young men in that city should reflect: In what way can I have great power, and no one may do me wrong?—this, it would seem, is the path he must take, to accustom himself from his earliest youth to be delighted and annoyed by the same things as his master, and contrive to be as like the other as possible. Is it not so, Callicles?
   Yes, Socrates.
   And so this man will have attained to a condition of suffering no wrong and having great power—as your party maintain—in the city.
   Certainly.
   And of doing no wrong likewise? Or is it quite the contrary, if he is to be like his unjust ruler, and have great influence with him? Well, for my part, I think his efforts will be all the opposite way, that is, towards enabling himself to do as much wrong as possible and to pay no penalty for the wrong he does; will they not?
   Apparently.
   And thus he will find himself possessed of the greatest evil, that of having his soul depraved and maimed as a result of his imitation of his master and the power he has got.
   You have a strange way of twisting your arguments, at each point. this way or that, Socrates.

Notes on the Text

• Meno 88a

⊕    Then let us, Meno, consider next the goods of the soul: by these you understand temperance, justice, courage, learning things easily, memory, magnanimity, and so forth?
   Yes, Socrates.
  Now tell me of these as you think are not knowledge, but different from knowledge--do they not sometimes harm us, and sometimes profit us? For example, courage, if it is courage apart from temperance, and only a sort of boldness: when a man is bold without intelligence, he is harmed; but when he has intelligence at the same time, he is profited, is he not?
   Yes.
⊕ And the same holds of temperance and the ability to learn easily: things learnt and coordinated with the aid of intelligence are profitable, but without intelligence they are harmful?
   Most certainly.
   And in brief, all the undertakings and endurances of the soul, when guided by wisdom, end in happiness, but when folly guides, in the opposite?
⊕    So it seems.
Then if virtue (ἀρετὴ) is something that is in the soul, and must needs be profitable, it ought to be wisdom, seeing that all the properties of the soul are in themselves neither profitable nor harmful, but are made either one or the other by the addition of wisdom or folly; and hence, by this argument, virtue being profitable must be a sort of wisdom.
⊕    I agree.
   Then as to the other things, wealth and the like, that we mentioned just now as being sometimes good and sometimes harmful--are not these also made profitable or harmful by the soul according as she uses and guides them rightly or wrongly: just as, in the case of the soul generally, we found that the guidance of wisdom makes profitable the properties of the soul, while that of folly makes them harmful?
   Certainly.
⊕    And the wise soul guides rightly, and the foolish erroneously?
   That is so.
   Then may we assert this as a universal rule, that in man all other things depend upon the soul, while the things of the soul herself depend upon wisdom, if they are to be good; and so by this account the profitable will be wisdom, and virtue, we say, is profitable?
   Certainly.
⊕    Hence we conclude that virtue is either wholly or partly wisdom?
   It seems to me that your statement, Socrates, is excellent.

Notes on the Text

The dramatic date of the Meno is shortly before 401 BCE, toward the end of the Peloponnesian War and before Meno joined Cyrus (son of Darius II of Persia) as one the generals commanding a contingent of Greek mercenaries.

Cyrus was killed that year in failed attempt to overthrow his brother, Artaxerxes II, the first-born son who had become King when Darius II died. In retribution for this attempted overthrow, Artaxerxes II had the generals commanding the mercenaries beheaded and had Meno tortured for a year before having him killed (Xenophon, Anabasis II.6).