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The Search for Definitions

The Euthyphro is a good example of a dialogue in which there is a search for a definition.

This search sems to be an instance of the questioning that Socrates, in the Apology, says that he will not stop pursuing even if it costs him his life, which it does in 399 BCE.

In his search, Socrates is looking for sufficient and jointly necessary conditions. In the Euthyphro, Socrates asks Euthyphro to tell him what piety is. Suppose he says that piety what is appropriate with respect to the gods. Then he is telling Socrates that something is pious just if, and only if, it is appropriate with respect to the gods. He is saying that being appropriate with respect to the gods is both sufficient and necessary for something to be pious.

None of the dialogues in which Socrates searches for a definition end with a definition that survives his testing in questioning. His interlocutors put forward new definitions. Socrates gets them to contradict these too, and eventually they return to their lives and the dialogue ends in "perplexity" (ἀπορία) or, more literally, "lack of passage" to the truth.

Socrates pursues the search for definitions in other dialogues too. I some include texts from some of these dialogues, but the most of the texts here are from the Euthyphro.

The dramatic date of the Euthyphro is 399 BCE, before Socrates was tried and executed.

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Click on images to enlarge



The remains of the Royal Stoa, discovered in June of 1970.



"How strange, Socrates, that you have left your accustomed haunts in the Lyceum [a gymnasium with covered walks in the Eastern suburb of Athens] and are now haunting at the portico of the King Archon? For it cannot be that you have an action before the king, as I do" (Euthyphro 2a).

"I must go to the portico of the King, to answer to the suit which Meletus has brought against me. But in the morning, Theodorus, let us meet here again" (Theaetetus 210d).

"I was making my way from the Academy straight to the Lyceum, by the road outside the town wall,— just under the wall; and when I reached the little gate that leads to the spring of Panops, I chanced there upon Hippothales, son of Hieronymus, and Ctesippus of Paeania, and some other youths with them, standing in a group together" (Lysis 203a).

"Who was it, Socrates, that you were talking with yesterday at the Lyceum? Why, there was such a crowd standing about you that when I came up in the hope of listening I could hear nothing distinctly: still, by craning over I got a glimpse, and it appeared to me that it was a stranger with whom you were talking" (Euthydemus 271a).

A "stoa" (στοά) is a portico or covered colonnade.



The "Stoa of the King", served as the office the legal magistrate known as the "King Archon," who was responsible for religious matters. The summons Meletus delivered required Socrates to appear in the Royal Stoa before the King Archon to answer the charge of impiety. The Archon determined whether the suit could proceed.

The Greeks understand murder as a religious offense. It fell under the jurisdiction of the King Archon because unless the murder is held responsible, the gods take offense at the taint of "pollution" that attaches to the murderer and those with whom he comes into contact.

Why the gods have this attitude is unclear. Socrates, in the Phaedo, says that "the gods are our guardians and that we men are one of the chattels of the gods" (Phaedo 62b) and that this is why suicide is prohibited.

"It is ridiculous, Socrates, that you think it matters whether the man who has killed is a stranger or a relative, and do not see that the only thing is whether the action of the slayer was justified or not, and that if it was justified one ought to let him alone, and if not, one ought to proceed against him, even if he shares one's hearth and eats at one's table. For the pollution (μίασμα) is the same if you associate knowingly with such a man and do not purify yourself and him by proceeding against him" (Euthyphro 4b).

Plato discusses regulations for various cases of homicide and the accompanying pollution in the Laws at IX.865a.


τὸ εὐσεβὲς, "the pious," "piety"
τὸ ἀσεβὲς, "the impious," "impiety"
τὸ ὅσιον, "the holy," "holiness"
τὸ ἀνόσιον, "the unholy," "unholiness"

The definite article and adjective can function as a noun. So "piety" and "impiety" translate τὸ εὐσεβὲς (which as two words is "the pious") and τὸ ἀσεβὲς ("the impious").

In the Euthyphro, Socrates treats τὸ εὐσεβὲς and τὸ ἀσεβὲς as synonymous with τὸ ὅσιον and τὸ ἀνόσιον. • Euthyphro 4a

Surely, Euthyphro, most people do not know where the right lies; for not everyone can rightly do what you are doing, but only someone already very far advanced in wisdom.

Notes on the Text

Euthyphro is a "seer" (μάντις), someone who divines (Euthyphro 3e). He thinks that he is wise and that he knows what to do in situations that would confuse those who lack wisdom. Socrates assumes that if Euthyphro has this wisdom, he should be able to answer certain questions about piety. Euthyphro thinks he will be able to answer, but he is unable to defend his answers when Socrates continues to question him. Socrates does not say that this failure shows that Euthyphro lacks wisdom, but the reader is left to draw this conclusion.

"most people do not know where the right lies."

What does this mean?

Most people do "know where the right lies" for at least some matters. Euthyphro, though, thinks he knows where it lies in a situation about which most people would be uncertain.

• Euthyphro 4e

  But, in the name of Zeus, Euthyphro, do you think your knowledge about divine laws and holiness and unholiness is so exact that, when the facts are as you say, you are not afraid of doing something unholy yourself in prosecuting your father for murder?
  I should be of no use, Socrates, and Euthyphro would be in no way different from other men, if I did not have exact knowledge about all such things.

Notes on the Text

Euthyphro claims "exact knowledge" of piety. He thinks he is an expert.

• Euthyphro 5a

  Then the best thing for me, my admirable Euthyphro, is to become your pupil and, before the suit with Meletus comes on [that Plato represents in the Apology], to challenge him and say that I always thought it very important before to know about divine matters and that now, since he says I am doing wrong by acting carelessly and making innovations in matters of religion, I have become your pupil. And "Meletus," I should say, "if you acknowledge that Euthyphro is wise in such matters, then believe that I also hold correct opinions, and do not bring me to trial; and if you do not acknowledge that, then bring a suit against him, my teacher, rather than against me, and charge him with corrupting the old, namely, his father and me, which he does by teaching me and by correcting and punishing his father." And if he does not do as I ask and does not release me from the indictment or bring it against you in my stead, I could say in the court the same things I said in my challenge to him, could I not?
  By Zeus, Socrates, if he should undertake to indict me, I fancy I should find his weak spot, and it would be much more a question about him in court than about me.

Notes on the Text

The argument is meant to be funny, but it exhibits a valid form.

Meletus accepts or does not accept that Euthyphro is an expert on religious matters and is Socrates's teacher. If he accepts, he should not bring Socrates to trail. If he does not accept, he should not bring Socrates to trail. It follows that Miletus should not bring Socrates to trail.

E = Euthyphro is an expert on religious matters and is Socrates's teacher
T = Miletus should bring Socrates to trail

1. E or not-E
2. If E, then not-T
3. If not-E, then not-T
----
4. not-T

What follows from both disjuncts is a consequence of the disjunction.

• Euthyphro 5c

  And I, my dear friend, perceiving this, wish to become your pupil; for I know that neither this fellow Meletus, nor anyone else, seems to notice you at all, but he has seen through me so sharply and so easily that he has indicted me for impiety. Now in the name of Zeus, Euthyphro, tell me what you just now asserted that you knew so well. What do you say about how the pious and the impious is, both in relation to murder and to other things? Is not the holy always the same with itself in every action and, on the other hand, is not the unholy the opposite of all holiness, always the same with itself and whatever is to be unholy possessing some one form?
  Certainly, Socrates.
  Tell me then, what do you say the holy is, and what the unholy is?

Notes on the Text

"possessing some one form (ἔχον μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν)"

What does this mean?

When we say something, x, is pious (or holy), what is the thing we are saying about x?

This thing we are saying, whatever it is, is the "some one form."

• Euthyphro 5d

I say that holiness is doing what I am doing now, prosecuting the wrongdoer who commits murder or steals from the temples or does any such thing, whether he be your father, or your mother or anyone else, and not prosecuting him is unholy. And, Socrates, see what a sure proof I offer you,—a proof I have already given to others,—that this is established and right and that we ought not to let him who acts impiously go unpunished, no matter who he may be. Men believe Zeus is the best and most just of the gods, and they acknowledge that he put his father in bonds because he wickedly devoured his children, and Zeus's father castrated his father for similar reasons; but they are incensed against me because I proceed against my father when he has done wrong, and so they are inconsistent in what they say about the gods and about me.

Notes on the Text

Euthyphro says that "holiness is doing what I am doing now."

In saying this, Plato portrays him as making a mistake. It may be that what Euthyphro is doing "now" when he meets Socrates (prosecuting his father) is holy, but doing this is not what holiness is. We can easily imagine holy actions that have nothing to do with Euthyphro and his father. So, to the question what is holiness, the answer "what I am doing now" is open to counterexample and thus is false. It is not the some one form Socrates is seeking.

The same is true for the other example of holiness that Euthyphro gives: "prosecuting the wrongdoer who ... steals from the temples." This is not what holiness is.

Euthyphro complains that those who deny that what he is doing is pious contradict themselves and so have a reason to withdraw their assertion that what he is doing is not pious.

Socrates will soon force Euthyphro to contradict himself and to with draw his assertions.

This shows that Socrates uses a practice in his questioning we recognize from ordinary life.

• Euthyphro 6d

  Now call to mind, Euthyphro, that this is not what I asked you, to tell me one or two of the many holy acts, but to tell me the form itself by which all holy acts are holy (αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος ᾧ πάντα τὰ ὅσια ὅσιά ἐστιν). For you said that all unholy acts were unholy and all holy ones holy by one form. Or don't you remember?
  I remember, Socrates.
  Tell me then what this form is so that I may pay attention to it and employ it as a pattern (παραδείγματι) and, if anything you or anyone else does agrees with it, may say that the act is holy, and if not, that it is unholy.

Notes on the Text

"keep my eye fixed upon it"

In a case in which we wonder about whether something is pious (for example, whether or not what Euthyphro is doing right now is pious), how do we make progress?

Socrates seems to think that if we knew what piety is, we could make progress by determining whether the thing in question meets the definition (and so has the form).

There can be a temptation to think what the definition specifies must be something whose instances we can easily recognize, but Socrates does not say this. Nor does it seem to be true.

⊕ "Protagoras, I find I am a forgetful sort of person, and if someone addresses me at any length I forget the subject on which he is talking. So, just as you, in entering on a discussion with me, would think fit to speak louder to me than to others if I happened to be hard of hearing, please bear in mind now that you have to deal with a forgetful person, and therefore cut up your answers into shorter pieces, that I may be able to follow you" (Protagoras 334c).

"Well, I said rather a branch of flattery. Why, at your age, Polus, have you no memory? What will you do later on?" (Gorgias 466a). "Or don't you remember?"

Socrates is making Euthyphro think about his thinking. To do that, he must remember it. Aristophanes, who makes fun of Socrates, makes a good memory necessary for the wisdom his Socrates teaches (Clouds 412). This suggests that that the phrase "Or don't you remember?" was something the historical Socrates would say to his interlocutors.

This emphasis on memory will reappear later in the empiricist tradition.

• Euthyphro 6e

  Well then, Socrates, what is dear to the gods is holy, and what is not dear to them is unholy.
  Excellent, Euthyphro, now you have answered as I asked you to answer. However, whether it is true, I am not yet sure; but you will, of course, show that what you say is true.

Notes on the Text

To the question what is holiness, Euthyphro finally gives an answer of the right form: that holiness and unholiness are what the gods love and what they hate.

Now that Socrates has a proposed definition, the next step is to test it.

• Euthyphro 8a

Then you did not answer my question, Euthyphro. For I did not ask you what is at once holy and unholy; but, judging from your reply, what is dear to the gods is also hateful to the gods.

Notes on the Text

"you did not answer my question."

Why?

Euthyphro has said that the holy and unholy are what the gods love and what they hate. He has also agreed that the gods disagree with one another in what they love and hate. If it follows that some things are holy and unholy, then Euthyphro commits himself to a contradiction.

It is not clear that it does follow, but Euthyphro does not see this.

• Euthyphro 9d

  But shall we now emend our definition and say that whatever all the gods hate is unholy and whatever they all love is holy, and what some love and others hate is neither or both? Do you wish this now to be our definition of holiness and unholiness?
  What is to hinder, Socrates?
  Nothing, so far as I am concerned, Euthyphro, but consider your own position, whether by adopting this definition you will most easily teach me what you promised.
  Well, I should say that what all the gods love is holy and, on the other hand, what they all hate is unholy.
  Then shall we examine this again, Euthyphro, to see if it is correct, or shall we let it go and accept our own statement, and those of others, agreeing that it is so, if anyone merely says that it is? Or ought we to inquire into the correctness of the statement?
  We ought to inquire. However, I think this is now correct.
  We shall soon know more about this, my friend.

Notes on the Text

Euthyphro tries again to say what the holy is, but again he cannot defend his answer.

• Euthyphro 12d

  If, Euthyphro, the holy is a part of the right (δικαίου), we must, apparently, find out what part of the right holiness is. Now if you asked me about one of the things I just mentioned, as, for example, what part of number the even was, and what kind of a number it was I should say, that which is not indivisible by two, but divisible by two; or don't you agree?
  I agree.
  Now try in your turn to teach me what part of the right holiness is, that I may tell Meletus not to wrong me any more or bring suits against me for impiety, since I have now been duly instructed by you about what is, and what is not, pious and holy.
  This then is my opinion, Socrates, that the part of the right which has to do with attention to the gods constitutes piety and holiness, and that the remaining part of the right is that which has to do with the service of men.
⊕

Notes on the Text

Euthyphro has met with no success, so Socrates tries to help him.

Socrates asks Euthyphro about the connection between the holy and the right (11e). In questioning from Socrates about this connection, Euthyphro commits himself to the proposition that the holy is part of "the right (δικαίου)."

What is "the right"?

δικαίου is a form of the adjective δίκαιος, which means "right, just, fitting."

• Euthyphro 12e

  I think you are correct, Euthyphro; but there is one little point about which I still want information, for I do not yet understand what you mean by "attention [to the gods is piety]." I don't suppose you mean the same kind of attention to the gods which is paid to other things. We say, for example, that not everyone knows how to attend to horses, but only he who is skilled in horsemanship, do we not?
  Certainly.
  Then horsemanship is the art of attending to horses?
  Yes.
  And not everyone knows how to attend to dogs, but only the huntsman?
  That is so.
  Then the huntsman's art is the art of attending to dogs?
  Yes.
  And the oxherd's art is that of attending to oxen?
  Certainly.
  And holiness and piety is the art of attending to the gods? Is that what you mean, Euthyphro?
  Yes.
  Now does attention always aim to accomplish the same end? I mean something like this: It aims at some good or benefit to the one to whom it is given, as you see that horses, when attended to by the horseman's art are benefited and made better; or don't you think so?
  Yes, I do.
  And dogs are benefited by the huntsman's art and oxen by the oxherd's and everything else in the same way? Or do you think care and attention are ever meant for the injury of that which is cared for?
  No, by Zeus, I do not.
  But for its benefit?
  Of course.
  Then holiness, since it is the art of attending to the gods, is a benefit to the gods, and makes them better? And you would agree that when you do a holy or pious act you are making one of the gods better?
  No, by Zeus, not I.
  Nor do I, Euthyphro, think that is what you meant. Far from it. But I asked what you meant by "attention to the gods" just because I did not think you meant anything like that.   You are right, Socrates; that is not what I mean.
  Well, what kind of attention to the gods is holiness?
  The kind, Socrates, that servants pay to their masters.
  I understand. It is, you mean, a kind of service to the gods?
  Exactly.
  Now can you tell me what result the art that serves the physician serves to produce? Is it not health?
  Yes.
  Well then; what is it which the art hat serves shipbuilders serves to produce?
  Evidently, Socrates, a ship.
  And that which serves housebuilders serves to build a house?
  Yes.
  Then tell me, my friend; what would the art which serves the gods serve to accomplish? For it is evident that you know, since you say you know more than any other man about matters which have to do with the gods.
  And what I say is true, Socrates.
  Then, in the name of Zeus, tell me, what is that glorious result which the gods accomplish by using us as servants?
  They accomplish many fine results, Socrates.
  Yes, and so do generals, my friend; but nevertheless, you could easily tell the chief of them, namely, that they bring about victory in war. Is that not the case?
  Of course.
  And farmers also, I think, accomplish many fine results; but still the chief result of their work is food from the land?
  Certainly.
  But how about the many fine results the gods accomplish? What is the chief result of their work?
  I told you a while ago, Socrates, that it is a long task to learn accurately all about these things. However, I say simply that when one knows how to say and do what is gratifying to the gods, in praying and sacrificing, that is holiness, and such things bring salvation to individual families and to states; and the opposite of what is gratifying to the gods is impious, and that overturns and destroys everything.
  You might, if you wished, Euthyphro, have answered much more briefly the chief part of my question. But it is plain that you do not care to instruct me. For now, when you were close upon it you turned aside; and if you had answered it, I should already have obtained from you all the instruction I need about holiness.

Notes on the Text

What is the point of the long exchange about "attention"?

Socrates thinks, it seems, that holiness and piety is what is "right" with respect to the gods. Euthyphro gets close to saying that, but he cannot defend his answers.

• Euthyphro 15c

  Then we must begin again at the beginning and examine what holiness is. Since I shall not willingly ⊕ "willingly" (ἑκὼν)

Proteus is mythical figure who could answer all questions but changed shapes to escape from answering. give up until I learn. And do not scorn me, but by all means apply your mind now to the utmost and tell me the truth; for you know, if anyone does, and like Proteus, you must be held until you speak. For if you had no clear knowledge of holiness and unholiness, you would surely not have undertaken to prosecute your aged father for murder for the sake of a servant. You would have been afraid to risk the anger of the gods, in case your conduct should be wrong, and would have been ashamed in the sight of men. But now I am sure you think you know what is holy and what is not. So tell me, most excellent Euthyphro, and do not conceal your thought.
  Some other time, Socrates. Now I am in a hurry and it is time for me to go.
  Oh my friend, what are you doing? You go away and leave me cast down from the high hope I had that I should learn from you what is holy, and what is not, and should get rid of Meletus's indictment by showing him that I have been made wise by Euthyphro about divine matters and am no longer through ignorance acting carelessly and making innovations in respect to them, and that I shall live a different life that is better.

Notes on the Text

Euthyphro has not successfully defended his answers. Socrates is a "lover of wisdom" (φιλόσοφος). He is ready to continue the search, but Euthyphro has had enough.

The dialogue thus ends in ἀπορία or "lack of passage" to the truth about piety.

Socrates he says if he had the wisdom he hoped to learn from Euthyphro, he would have lived a "different" and "better" life. This suggests that Socrates thinks that knowing what piety and the other virtues are is sufficient for possessing the wisdom one needs to live well.

• Laches 179a

[W]e [Lysimachus and Melesias] have resolved to give them [our sons] our most constant care, and not--as most fathers do when their boys begin to be young men--let them run loose as their fancy leads them, but begin forthwith taking every possible care of them. Now, knowing that you [Nicias and Laches, two Athenian generals] too have sons, we thought that you above all men must have concerned yourselves with the question of the kind of upbringing that would make the best of them; and if by any chance you have not given your attention to the subject, we would remind you that it ought not to be neglected, and we invite you to join us in arranging some way of taking care of our sons.

Notes on the Text

⊕ "I happened to meet a man who has spent more on sophists (σοφισταῖς) than all the rest, Callias, the son of Hipponicus. So I asked him—for he has two sons—if your sons were colts or calves, we should be able to hire an overseer who would make them good in the virtue proper to them (τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀρετήν), and he would be a horse-trainer or a husbandman. But since they are human beings, whom have you in mind to get as overseer? Who has knowledge (ἐπιστήμων) of that kind of virtue, that of a man and a citizen (ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ πολιτικῆς)? I assume you have looked into the matter, Callias, as you have two sons. Is there anyone or not" (Apology 20a)? Lysimachus and Melesias want to know how they should educate their sons because they have not done as well in life as their famous fathers (Aristides and Thucydides). It is natural for parents to want good lives for their children, and Lysimachus and Melesias are troubled because they do not know how to proceed. They turn to Socrates for advice, and he questions the Athenian generals Laches and Nicias about the form the education should take.

• Laches 185d

  And we say that our present subject [the proper education for the young] is an accomplishment studied for the sake of young men's souls?
  Yes, Socrates.

Notes on the Text

• Laches 186a

Lysimachus and Melesias have invited us to a consultation on their sons, whose souls they are anxious to have as good as possible (ὅτι ἀρίστας γενέσθαι τὰς ψυχάς).

Notes on the Text

• Laches 190b

  And you know, Laches, at this moment our two friends are inviting us to a consultation as to the way in which virtue (ἀρετὴ) may be joined to their sons' souls, and so make them better?
⊕   Yes, indeed, Socrates.
  Then our first requisite is to know what virtue is? For surely, if we had no idea at all what virtue actually is, we could not possibly consult with anyone as to how he might best acquire it?
  I certainly think not.
  Then we say, Laches, that we know what it is.
  I suppose we must.
  And of that which we know, I presume, we can also say what it is.
  To be sure.
⊕ Socrates focuses the conversation on what courage is because this is the traditional virtue of character that the generals Laches and Nicias should understand.   Let us not, therefore, my good friend, inquire forthwith about the whole of virtue, since that may well be too much for us; but let us first see if we are sufficiently provided with knowledge about some part of it. In all likelihood this will make our inquiry easier.
  Yes, let us do as you propose, Socrates.
  Then which of the parts of virtue shall we choose? Clearly, I think, that which the art of fighting in armor is supposed to promote; and that, of course, is generally supposed to be courage, is it not?
  Yes, it generally is, to be sure.
  Then let our first endeavor be, Laches, to say what courage is. After that we can proceed to inquire in what way our young men may obtain it, in so far as it is to be obtained by means of pursuits and studies. Come, try and tell me, as I suggest, what is courage: after that we can proceed to inquire in what way our young men may obtain it, in so far as it is to be obtained by means of pursuits and studies. ⊕ Come, try and tell me, as I suggest, what is courage.

Notes on the Text

Socrates seems to assume that virtue in the soul consists in the virtues of character.

• Laches 191d

I wanted to have your view not only of brave men-at-arms, but also of courage in cavalry and in the entire warrior class; and of the courageous not only in war but in the perils of the sea, and all who in disease and poverty, or again in public affairs, are courageous; and further, all who are not merely courageous against pain or fear, but doughty fighters against desires and pleasures, whether standing their ground or turning back upon the foe—for I take it, Laches, there are courageous people in all these kinds.

Notes on the Text

To the question what is courage, Laches says that "anyone who is willing to stay at his post and face the enemy, and does not run away, you may be sure, is courageous" (190e).

Socrates explains that he is asking what courage is in general. This is the point he makes to Euthyphro when he says that he is asking about the "one form."

• Hippias Major 287c

⊕ Hippias is a Sophist.

"Is justice something, Protagoras, or not a thing at all? I think it is" (Protagoras 330c).

  "Suppose he questioned us further. 'Do you also say there is a thing called piety?' We would say we do, right?
  Right.
  'Do you say this too is a thing?' We would say we do, would we not?
  Yes, Socrates" (Protagoras 330d).

  "There is, I take it, something you call body and something you call soul?
  Yes, of course" (Gorgias 463e).

  "Callicles, there is something, I suppose, that you call knowledge?
   Yes, Socrates" (Gorgias 495c).   [H]e would say, 'Stranger from Elis, is it not by justice that the just are just?' So answer, Hippias, as though he were asking the question.
  I shall answer that it is by justice.
  'And this is something, justice (ἔστι τι τοῦτο, ἡ δικαιοσύνη)?'
  Certainly.
  'Then, too, by wisdom the wise are wise and by the good all things are good, are they not?'
  Of course.
  'And justice, wisdom, and so forth are something; for the just, wise, and so forth would not be such by them, if they were not something.'
  To be sure, they are something.
  'Then are not all beautiful things beautiful by the beautiful?'
  Yes, by the beautiful.
  By the beautiful, which is something?'
  Yes, for what alternative is there?
  'Tell me, then, stranger,' he will say, 'what is this, the beautiful (τί ἐστι τοῦτο τὸ καλόν)?'.

Notes on the Text

This again is the idea we saw in the Euthyphro at 5c.

• Meno 71e

⊕   Why, there is no difficulty, Socrates, in telling [you what virtue is]. First of all, if you take the virtue of a man, it is easily stated that a man's virtue is this--that he be competent to manage the affairs of his city, and to manage them so as to benefit his friends and harm his enemies, and to take care to avoid suffering harm himself. Or take a woman's virtue: there is no difficulty in describing it as the duty of ordering the house well, looking after the property indoors, and obeying her husband. And the child has another virtue--one for the female, and one for the male; and there is another for elderly men--one, if you like, for freemen, and yet another for slaves. And there are very many other virtues besides, so that one cannot be at a loss to explain what virtue is; for it is according to each activity and age that every one of us, in whatever we do, has his virtue; and the same, I take it, Socrates, will hold also of vice.
  I seem to be in a most lucky way, Meno; for in seeking one virtue I have discovered a whole swarm of virtues there in your keeping. Now, Meno, to follow this figure of a swarm, suppose I should ask you what is the real nature (οὐσίας) of the bee, and you replied that there are many different kinds of bees, and I rejoined: Do you say it is by being bees that they are of many and various kinds and differ from each other, or does their difference lie not in that, but in something else--for example, in their beauty or size or some other quality? Tell me, what would be your answer to this question?
  Why, this--that they do not differ, as bees, the one from the other.
  And if I went on to say: Well now, there is this that I want you to tell me, Meno: what do you say this is by which they do not differ, but are all alike? You could find me an answer, I presume?
  I could.
  And likewise also with the virtues, however many and various they may be, they all have one common character whereby they are virtues, and on which one would of course be wise to keep an eye when one is giving a definitive answer to the question of what virtue really is. You take my meaning, do you not?
  My impression is that I do; but still I do not yet grasp the meaning of the question as I could wish.
  Is it only in the case of virtue, do you think, Meno, that one can say there is one kind belonging to a man, another to a woman, and so on with the rest, or is it just the same, too, in the case of health and size and strength? Do you consider that there is one health for a man, and another for a woman? Or, wherever we find health, is it of the same character universally, in a man or in anyone else?
  I think that health is the same, both in man and in woman.
  Then is it not so with size and strength also? If a woman is strong, she will be strong by reason of the same form and the same strength; by 'the same' I mean that strength does not differ as strength, whether it be in a man or in a woman. Or do you think there is any difference?
  I do not.
  And will virtue, as virtue, differ at all whether it be in a child or in an elderly person, in a woman or in a man?
  I feel somehow, Socrates, that here we cease to be on the same ground as in those other cases.

Notes on the Text

Meno has trouble understanding what Socrates is asking for when he asks for a definition.

• Republic I.354a

⊕ "justice" (τὸ δίκαιον)

"vice" (κακία)

"ignorance" (ἀμαθία)

"wisdom" (σοφία)

"virtue" (ἀρετή)

"more profitable" (λυσιτελέστερον)

"happy" (εὐδαίμων) I have not dined well, however--by my own fault, not yours, Thrasymachus. Just as gluttons snatch at every dish that is handed along and taste it before they have properly enjoyed the preceding, so I, before finding the first object of our inquiry--what justice is--let go of that and set out to consider something about it, namely whether it is vice and ignorance or wisdom and virtue; and again, when later the view was sprung upon us that injustice is more profitable than justice I could not refrain from turning to that from the other topic. So that for me the present outcome of the discussion is that I know nothing. For if I don't know what the just is, I shall hardly know whether it is a virtue or not, and whether its possessor is or is not happy.

Notes on the Text

The Republic is one of Plato's greatest dialogues.

Unlike the Euthyphro and other early dialogues, the Republic does not end in ἀπορία.