Socratic Intellectualism

⊕   "For I say, Polus, that the rhetors and despots have the least power in their cities, as I stated just now; since they do just about nothing that they wish to do though they do whatever they think to be best. ... For do you regard it as a good, when a man does what he thinks to be best, without having intelligence (νοῦν)? Is that what you call having a great power?
  No, I do not.
  Then will you prove that the rhetors have intelligence, and that rhetoric is an art, not a flattery, and so refute me? Else, if you are going to leave me unrefuted, the rhetors who do what they think to be best in their cities, and the despots, will find they have got no good in doing that, if indeed power is, as you say, a good, but doing what one thinks without intelligence is--as you yourself admit, do you not?--bad" (Gorgias 466d).

  "Is it your view, Polus, that people wish merely that which they do each time, or that which is the object of their doing what they do? For instance, do those who take medicine by doctor's orders wish, in your opinion, merely wish for what they do,--to take the medicine and suffer the pain of it,--or rather to be healthy, which is the object of their taking it?
  To be healthy, without a doubt.
  And so with seafarers and such as pursue profit generally in trade; what they wish is not what they are doing at each moment--for who wishes to go on a voyage, and incur all its danger and trouble? It is rather, I conceive, the object of their voyage--to get wealth; since it is for wealth that they go on it.
  Certainly.
  And is it not just the same in every case? If a man acts for something, he does not wish the thing that he does, but the thing for which he does it.
  Yes.
  Now is there any existent thing that is not either good or bad or between these—neither good nor bad?
  Most assuredly nothing, Socrates.
  Well, do you call wisdom and health and wealth and everything else of that kind good, and their opposites bad?
  I do.
  And by things neither good nor bad do you mean such things as sometimes partake of the good, sometimes of the bad, and sometimes of neither—for example, sitting, walking, running, and sailing, or again, stones and sticks and anything else of that sort? These are what you mean, are they not? Or are there other things that you describe as neither good nor bad?
  No, these are what I mean.
  Then do people do these intermediate things, when they do them, for the sake of the good things, or the good things for the intermediate?
  The intermediate, I presume, for the good.
  Thus it is in pursuit of the good that we walk, when we walk, conceiving it to be better; or on the contrary, stand, when we stand, for the sake of the same thing, the good: is it not so?
  Yes.
  And so we put a man to death, if we do put him to death, or expel him or deprive him of his property, because we think it better for us to do this than not?
  Certainly.
  "So it is for the sake of the good that the doers do all these things [that are neither nor good nor bad]?
  I agree.
  And we have admitted that when we do things for an object, we do not wish those things, but the object for which we do them?
  Quite so.
  Then we do not simply wish to slaughter people or expel them from our cities or deprive them of their property, but if these things are beneficial we wish to do them, while if they are harmful, we do not wish them. For we wish what is good, as you say; but what is neither good nor bad we do not wish, nor what is bad either, do we? Is what I say true in your opinion, Polus, or not? Why do you not answer?
  It is true.
  Then, as we agree on this, if a man puts anyone to death or expels him from a city or deprives him of his property, whether he does it as a despot or a rhetor, because he thinks it better for himself though it is really worse, that man, I take it, does what he thinks fit, does he not?
  Yes.
  Now is it also what he wishes, supposing it to be really bad? Why do you not answer?
  No, I do not think he does what he wishes.
  Can such a man then be said to have great power in that city, if to have great power is something good, according to your admission?
  He cannot, Socrates.
  Then I spoke the truth when I said that it is possible for a man to do what he thinks fit in a city and yet not to have great power nor to do what he wishes" (Gorgias 467c). In the Gorgias and the Meno, Socrates may think some desires are not beliefs. This interpretation, if it is right, muddies the assessment of what the historical Socrates thought.

Belief and Desire in the Gorgias

Socrates says that although rhetors do nothing they "wish," they do what they "think is best."

What does this assertion tell us about what happens in the soul?

Here is one possiblity.

We "wish" for ends we believe are good and do what we "think is best" to achieve them. We wish for health and follow the doctor's orders to achieve it.

Here is another possiblity.

The "wish" is a standing desire in the soul. We wish for what is best, and we try to satisfy this wish by acting on our beliefs about what is good and what is bad.

In this possiblity, the "wish" is a counterexample to the intellectualism in the Protagoras.

Belief and Desire in the Meno

Meno says that virtue is "to desire what is fine and be able to procure it" (Meno 77b).

After some questioning, Socrates says that "[o]ne part of the statement—the wish—belongs to our common nature, and in this respect one man is no better than another."

  "Well now, Meno, you were saying a moment ago that virtue is the wish and ability to get good things?
  Yes, I was.
One part of the statement—the wish—belongs to our common nature, and in this respect one man is no better than another?
  Apparently, Socrates" (Meno 78b).

Socrates here, again, seems to say that "the wish" is a standing desire for what is best.

⊕

Two Interpretations

Maybe the Gorgias and the Meno are inconsistent with the Protagoras.

Maybe Plato took Socrates to think that we always do what we think is as least as good as our alternatives. In the Protagoras, Plato is working with one explanation for the the soul works so that this is true. In the Gorgias and the Meno, he is working with another.

Maybe Plato only changes the way he makes Socrates talk.

Desires are beliefs we form in an exercise of reason. No antecedent desire sets this process in motion. This is just how the human beings work. In the Gorgias and the Meno, Socrates describes this fact about human beings by saying that they wish for what is best.

Which, if either interpretation, is correct?

I am not sure.

I am suspicious of the second, though, because it seems to presuppose the contemporary view that beliefs supply information, not motivation. If we think of belief and desire this way, it is going to be easy for us think that Socrates must of have thought this too.

"[H]owever much Plato may have admired Socrates, he also had a critical distance toward him. There is very little, if anything, we know about the real Socrates. But if we do know anything about him, it seems that he disapproved of natural philosophy, had no interest in metaphysics, was an extreme intellectualist; these are all rather fundamental points in which Plato came to differ from Socrates. So we should not, without further argument, exclude the possibility that the dialogues reflect some criticism of Socrates, and we should not exclude the possibility that the very arguments of the dialogues in which Socrates is made to be the main speaker also reflect some of that criticism" (Michael Frede, "Plato’s Arguments and the Dialogue Form" 204-205. The Methods of Interpreting Plato and his Dialogues. Edited by James Carl Klagge and Nicholas D. Smith. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy. Supplementary Volume, 1992, 201-219.)