ARISTOTLE

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The Existence of Natural Bodies

Aristotle thinks that each natural body has a "nature" (φύσις) and that this nature is the "starting point of change and staying unchanged." The nature, in this way, is what unites the differences in the history of a natural body so that these differences are changes in the history of one object. In the absence of the nature, there is only a heap of materials.

• Physics II.1.192b

Of things that exist, some exist by nature, some from other causes. By nature the animals and their parts exist, and the plants and the simple bodies (earth, fire, air, water)—for we say that these and the like exist by nature. All the things mentioned present a feature in which they differ from things which are not constituted by nature. Each of them has within itself a starting-point of change and staying unchanged.... For nature is the starting-point and cause of being moved and of being at rest.

Notes on the Text

Aristotle is trying to understand something we commonly think.

We think that natural bodies, especially living natural bodies, are objects that can persist through change as one object whose properties change. The challenge is explain how this is true and why these bodies are not really just heaps of material.

Aristotle proposes that they are not heaps because they have a nature.

• Physics II.1.193a

In one way nature is said to be the ultimately underlying mater (ὕλη) of all things that have in themselves the principle of movement and change. In ⊕ "nature is said to be the shape or form according to the account (ἡ μορφὴ καὶ τὸ εἶδος τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον)"

"not separable except according to the account (οὐ χωριστὸν ὂν ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ τὸν λόγον)" another way, nature is said to be the shape or form according to the account. ... What is potentially flesh or bone has not yet its own nature, and does not exist by nature, until it receives the form according to the account, which we name in defining what flesh or bone is. ... [N]ature [said in this way] is the shape or form not separable except according to the account of things in them which is a starting point of motion. And this is more [what] nature [is] than the matter [is].

Notes on the Text

The philosophical challenge for Aristotle is to understand what a nature is.

He works in the Platonic tradition. He thinks the natures of natural bodies are forms, but he is also Plato's first great critic. Aristotle has a different understanding of how forms exist. Aristotle thinks that the forms of natural bodies are "not separable except according to account."

What does this mean?

• Physics II.1.193a.

[One of the things] nature is said to be is the shape and form according to the account (ἡ μορφὴ καὶ τὸ εἶδος τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον)

Notes on the Text

• Physics II.1.193b

What is potentially flesh or bone has not yet its own nature, and does not exist by nature, until it receives the form according to the account (τὸ εἶδος τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον), which we name in defining what flesh or bone is. ... [So that in this way,] the nature of things having a starting point of motion is the shape or form, which is not separable except according to the account (οὐ χωριστὸν ὂν ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ τὸν λόγον). ... And this is more [what] nature [is] than the material (ὕλης) [is].

Notes on the Text

• Metaphysics VIII.1042a.

"[T]he account and shape, which is individual and separable according to account (ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ μορφή, ὃ τόδε τι ὂν τῷ λόγῳ χωριστόν ἐστιν)"

Notes on the Text

• Physics II.8.198b

This is the difficulty: why should we suppose nature acts for something and because it is better? Why should not everything be like the rain? Zeus does not drop the rain to make the corn may grow. It comes of necessity. For the rising vapour must needs be condensed into water by the cold, and must then descend, and incidentally, when this happens, the corn grows. Similarly also, if someone’s corn on the threshing floor is ruined it does not rain for the sake of this, so that the corn is ruined, but the result is incidental to the raining. What, then, is to stop the parts of nature from being like this--the front teeth of necessity growing sharp and suitable for biting, and the back teeth broad and serviceable for chewing the food, not coming to be for this, but by coincidence? And similarly for the other parts in which the for something (τὸ ἕνεκά του) seems to be present. So that when all things turned out just as they had come to be for something, then the things, suitably constituted as an automatic outcome, survived; when not, they died, and die, as Empedocles says of the man-headed calves. This difficulty, or something like it, is the account which might give us pause. It is impossible, however, that this should be how things are. The things mentioned, and all the things which are due to nature, come to be as they do always or for the most part, and nothing which is the outcome of luck or an automatic outcome does that. We do not think that it is the outcome of luck or coincidence that there is a lot of rain in winter, but only if there is a lot of rain in August; nor that there are heatwaves in August, but only if there is a heatwave in winter. If, then, things seem to be either a coincidental outcome or for something, and the things we are discussing cannot neither be a coincidental nor a automatic outcome, they must be for something. But all such things are due to nature, as the authors of the views under discussion themselves admit. The for something, then, is present in things which are and come to be due to nature.

Notes on the Text

Aristotle thinks the "for something" is present in natural bodies.

He thinks that if "for something" is present were not present, it would be a coincidence that they function in the ways they do and that this behavior benefits them. This, however, is not a coincidence. Coincidences happen infrequently, like a heatwave in winter.

Aristotle is right, it seems, that it is not a coincidence.

Aristotle's explanation of the regularity in terms of the "for something" is much less plausible.

• Physics II.2.194b

⊕ "Physics is a kind of wisdom (σοφία), but not the primary kind" (Metaphysics IV.?.1005b).

"[T]he study of sensible substances belongs to physics or second philosophy; for the physicist must know not only about the matter (ὕλης), but also about the substance according to the account (κατὰ τὸν λόγον)" (Metaphysics VII.11.1037a). To what point should the physicist know the form and the what it is? ... [To the point of] what is separable in form but in matter (χωριστὰ μὲν εἴδει, ἐν ὕλῃ δέ) ... What is separable, and how things are with it, is a question for first philosophy to determine.

Notes on the Text

The forms of natural bodies are "in matter" and "separable in account."

What does this mean?

• On the Soul I.4.408b

We speak of the soul as being pained or pleased, being bold or fearful, being angry, perceiving, thinking. All these things are regarded as modes of movement, and hence it might be inferred that the soul is moved. This, however, does not follow. We may admit that being pained or pleased, or thinking, are movements, and that the soul is the cause of these movements. For example, we may regard anger or fear as such and such movements of the heart.... Yet to say that the soul is angry is like saying that the soul weaves or builds houses. Doubtless it is better to avoid saying that the soul pities or learns or thinks, and to say instead that the man does this with his soul.

Notes on the Text

Aristotle thinks the soul is the starting point for change. It itself does not change.

• On the Soul II.1.412a

⊕ "The soul of living things is the substance which accords with the account, i.e., the form and what it is to be such a body" (Metaphysics VII.1035b). Substances (οὐσίαι) most of all are thought to be bodies, especially natural bodies, for they are the starting points for other bodies. Of the natural bodies, some have life and some do not. Life we say is self-nutrition and growth and decay. Thus every natural body having life is a substance as a composite. But since it is a body of a definite kind, viz., having life, the body cannot be soul, for the body is not something predicated of a subject, but rather is itself to be regarded as a subject, i.e., as matter. So the soul must be substance as the form of a natural body, which potentially has life. And substance is actuality (ἐντελέχεια). The soul, then, is the actuality of a body. But actuality is of two kinds, corresponding to knowledge and contemplation . The soul is actuality like knowledge. Sleeping and waking presuppose the existence of soul, and waking corresponds to contemplation, sleeping to knowledge since it comes first. That is why the soul is the first actuality of a natural body having life potentially in it.

Notes on the Text

Substances are the subjects for predication.

The argument "the body cannot be soul" is a little hard to follow. The idea is that the body is the subject we are talking about when we say it has a soul.

What we are saying is that the "soul is the actuality of the body."

What does this mean?

• On the Soul II.4.415b

The substance is the cause of existing, and here, in the case of living things, to exist is to live, and the soul (ψυχή) in them is the cause and starting-point.

Notes on the Text

The soul is the starting point in the explanation for the existence of a living natural body. What a living natural body does is live in the way that characterizes the kind. The soul, as the organization of the material, is the starting point in the explanation of this activity.