ARISTOTLE

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The Good Life for a Human Being

In the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle discusses the good life for a human being.

The relationship between the Eudemian Ethics and Nicomachean Ethics is uncertain, but the Nicomachean Ethics is traditionally thought to represent Aristotle's considered opinion.

IV, V, and VI of the Eudemian Ethics are identical to V, VI, and VII of the Nicomachean Ethics.

Aristotle's discussions in the Nicomachean Ethics are not always easy to follow. In part, this is true because the Nicomachean Ethics is more a set of notes than a finished work.

To understand what Aristotle was thinking, it helps to keep in mind that he is a Platonist and that on the good life he working against a background that includes Plato's Republic.

• Nicomachean Ethics I.4.1095a

⊕ "Every art and every investigation, and likewise every action and choice (προαίρεσις), seems to aim at some good. ... If among the ends at which our actions aim, one we desire (βουλόμεθα) for its own sake, and the others only for the sake of this, ... it is the best good (τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον). ... Knowledge of this good is of great practical importance for the conduct of lives because, like archers, archers having a target to aim at, we are more likely to hit the right mark. If this is so, we ought to make an attempt to determine at least in outline what this best good is" (Nicomachean Ethics I.1.1094a).

"[This best good] is proper to the most authoritative and ruling [knowledge], and this appears to be politics (πολιτικὴ)" (Nicomachean Ethics I.1.1094a).

"[The end of politics is] the human good (τἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν)" (Nicomachean Ethics I.1.1094b).

"For those who accord with reason (λόγον) in forming their desires and in their actions, about this [good] it will be a great benefit to know" (Nicomachean Ethics I.3.1095a). Let us discuss what it is that we pronounce to be the aim of politics, that is, what is the highest of all the goods that action can achieve. As far as the name goes, we may almost say that the great majority of mankind are agreed about this; for both the multitude and persons of refinement speak of it as happiness, and conceive the good life or doing well to be the same thing as being happy. But what constitutes happiness is a matter of dispute; and the popular account of it is not the same as that given by the wise.

Notes on the Text

a good = something beneficial = something that benefits us to possess

What is the best good achievable in action?

Our actions bring this good into our lives.

What is this good?

Aristotle thinks it is commonly agreed to be "happiness" (εὐδαιμονία).

This agreement does not take us very far.

We need to know what we are doing in a life in which we are "happy" (εὐδαίμων).

• Nicomachean Ethics I.5.1095b

The three kinds of lives that stand out are ⊕ the life of gratification, the life of politics (πολιτικὸς), and third, the life of contemplation (θεωρητικός).

Notes on the Text

Aristotle mentions three possibilities for the life that benefits us as a human being most to live.

• Nicomachean Ethics I.5.1096a

The third life is the life of contemplation, which we shall examine in what follows.

Notes on the Text

Socrates puts forward this life as the best in the Republic.

Aristotle tries to get clear on what the best life is. In part, he does this to determine whether this best life turns out to be the life of contemplation, as Plato had thought.

• Nicomachean Ethics I.7.1097b

⊕ "For just as the good and doing well, for a flute-player, sculptor, and craftsman of any sort, and in general of anybody who has some function or business to perform, is thought to reside in that function; and similarly it may be held that the good of man resides in the function of man, if he has a function. Are we then to suppose that, while the carpenter and the shoemaker have definite functions or businesses belonging to them, man as such has none, and is not by nature to fulfill any function? Must we not rather assume that, just as the eye, the hand, the foot and each of the various members of the body manifestly has a certain function of its own, so a human being also has a certain function over and above all the functions of his particular members? What then precisely can this function be? Living appears to be shared even by plants, whereas we are looking for the function peculiar to man; we must therefore set aside nutrition and growth. Next will come some of life sense perception; but this too appears to be shared by horses, oxen, and animals generally. There remains therefore what may be called some sort of life of action of [the part of the soul] with reason" (Nicomachean Ethics I.7.1097b).

  "The soul, has it a function (ἔργον) which you couldn't accomplish with anything else in the world, as for example, to manage things, rule, deliberation, and the like, is there anything else than soul to which you could rightly assign these and say that they were its peculiar work?
  Nothing else, Socrates" (Republic I.353d). To say the good is happiness will probably appear a truism; we still require a more explicit account of what constitutes happiness. Perhaps then we may arrive at this by ascertaining the function of man (τὸ ἔργον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου).

Notes on the Text

To make progress, Aristotle considers what the "function" of a human being is.

Aristotle concludes that the function of a human is "some sort of life of action of [the part of the soul] with reason (πρακτική τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος)."

This follows from what Aristotle thinks a human being is.

Aristotle thinks that natural bodies behave in the ways that characterize the natural kind. They have this behavior because they are forms in matter. The form is the organization of the matter according to which there is an object that belongs to the natural kind. Human beings, for Aristotle, are rational animals. Their behavior involves what Aristotle calls reason.

We should not think we are in agreement with Aristotle about what reason is.

Aristotle follows Plato's view in the Tripartite Theory of the Soul.

• Nicomachean Ethics I.7.1098a

If we declare that the function of man is a certain life, and that this is an activity and ⊕ business of the soul with reason, and that the good of man is to do this well and beautifully, and that if a function is completed well when it is completed in accordance with its proper virtue (οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν), then from these premises it follows that the good of man is the activity of his soul in conformity with virtue, or if there are several virtues, then the good of man is the activity of his soul in conformity with the best and most the end (κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τελειοτάτην).

Notes on the Text

⊕   "The just soul and the just man then will live well and the unjust badly?
  So it appears by your reasoning, Socrates.
  But surely he who lives well is blessed and happy, and he who does not the contrary.
  Of course.
  Then the just is happy and the unjust miserable.
  So be it, Socrates" (Republic I.353e). Given that a human being has a function and that things with functions perform them well if they have their "proper virtues," a human being lives a good life if he has the virtues proper for a "life of action of [the part of the soul] with reason (πρακτική τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος).

  1.  The good life is one in which a human being achieves the best good
  2.  A human being who achieves the best good is a good human being
  3.  A good human being is one who performs the human function well
  4.  The human function is "action of [the part of the soul] having reason"
  ----
  5.  The good life is a life of performing this human function well

To understand what Aristotle was thinking, we need to know how he understood what "action of the [part of the soul] having reason" is and what it is to perform this action well.

• Nicomachean Ethics I.13.1102a

Inasmuch as happiness is a certain activity (ἐνέργειά) of soul in conformity with complete virtue (ἀρετὴν τελείαν), it is necessary to examine what virtue is.

Notes on the Text

The next step in the investigation is to think about the parts of the soul and their virtues.

• Nicomachean Ethics I.13.1103a

⊕ "We have discussed this sufficiently in our popular discourses (ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις), and we should use this discussion. We have said that one part is without reason (ἄλογον) and that one has reason (λόγον ἔχον)" (Nicomachean Ethics I.13.1102a).

"Another nature in the soul would also seem to be without reason though in a way to share in it. For in the continent and the incontinent we praise their reason, i.e., the part that has reason, because it exhorts them correctly and towards what is best; but they evidently also have in them another part that is by nature something besides reason, conflicting and struggling with reason" (Nicomachean Ethics I.13.1102b).

  "Are we to say that some men sometimes though thirsty refuse to drink?
  We are indeed, many and often.
  What then, should one affirm about them? Is it not that there is something in the soul that bids them to drink and a something that forbids, a different something that masters (κρατοῦν) that which bids?
  I think so.
  And is it not the fact that that which inhibits such actions arises when it arises from the calculations of reason (λογισμοῦ), but the impulses which draw and drag come through affections and diseases?
  Apparently.
  Not unreasonably, shall we claim that they are two and different from one another, naming that in the soul whereby it reckons and reasons the reasoning part (λογιστικὸν) and that with which it loves, hungers, thirsts, and gets passionately excited by other desires, the unreasoning (ἀλόγιστόν) and appetitive part (ἐπιθυμητικόν)—companion of various repletions and pleasures.
  It would not be unreasonable but quite natural, Socrates" (Republic IV.439c). If we should say that this part [of the soul, the part capable of being controlled by reason,] has reason, then the part [of the soul] that has reason will have two parts, one that has authority in itself, and one that listens as to a father. Now virtue also is differentiated in correspondence with this division of the soul. Some forms of virtue are called virtues of thought [or: the intellect (διανοητικὰς)], others virtues of character (ἠθικάς): Wisdom or intelligence and prudence are virtues of thought, liberality and temperance are virtues of character

Notes on the Text

Aristotle divides the part with reason divides into two parts.

The human soul =
        1. part having reason
              1.a. part with reason
              1.b. part with reason as its controller
        2. part not having reason

The proper virtues of (1.a) and (1.b) are virtues of thought and character respectively.

• Nicomachean Ethics II.3.1104b

⊕

"It is impossible, or not easy, to alter by argument what has long been absorbed by habit" (Nicomachean Ethics X.1179b).

"Arguments and teaching do not influence in all circumstances. The soul of the student needs to have been prepared by habits for enjoying and hating finely. ... Before we acquire virtue, we must already in some way have a character suitable for virtue, fond of what enjoying and objecting to what is shameful" (Nicomachean Ethics X.1179b). Virtue of character is concerned with pleasures and pains. For pleasure causes us to do base actions and pain causes us to abstain from doing noble actions. Hence the importance, as Plato points out [in Laws II.553a, for example], of having the right upbringing from childhood to like and dislike the proper things; this is what good education means.

Notes on the Text

The virtues of character prevent the prospect of pleasure or pain from causing us to act incorrectly. We acquire these virtues as we become adults if we have the right upbringing.

This "right" upbringing is a major focus in Plato's Republic. Given this upbringing, Socrates recommends that the lovers of wisdom expel everyone over the age of ten because starting from scratch is the "quickest and easiest way" to establish a just city and thus to "confer the greatest benefits on the people among whom it is established" (Republic VII.541a).

⊕ "What comes about by force or because of ignorance seems to be ἀκούσια. What is forced has an external origin, the sort of origin in which the agent or victim contributes nothing--if, e.g., a wind or human beings who control him were to carry him off" (Nicomachean Ethics III.1.1109b).

"What is ἑκούσιον seems to be what has its origin in the agent himself when he knows the particulars in which the action consists" (Nicomachean Ethics III.2.1111a).


"What sort of thing is [choice (προαίρεσις)], since is it is none of the things mentioned. It is ἑκούσιον, but not everything ἑκούσιον is a choice. So choice is proceeded by deliberation. For choice involves reason and thought (λόγου καὶ διανοίας)" (Nicomachean Ethics III.2.1112a).

"We deliberate about what is up to us and we can do (βουλευόμεθα δὲ περὶ τῶν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν καὶ πρακτῶν)" (Nicomachean Ethics III.3.1112a).

"[Choice] is not present in other animals, nor at every time of life, nor in a human being no matter what state he is in; for deliberation is not, either, nor a judgment about the why; a belief about whether something should be done or not may well be present in many, though not through reasoning" (Eudemian Ethics II.10.1226b).

"For that part of the soul is deliberative which is capable of discerning a cause: the for sake of which—which is one of the causes—‘cause’ being something because-of-which. And we say that the for sake of which something is or comes to be is a cause—for instance, the carrying of goods is a cause of walking if it is for the sake of that that a man walks. That is why those who have no goal before them are not in a position to deliberate" (Eudemian Ethics II.10.1226b).

"[S]laves and animals have no share in happiness or in a life according to choice" (Politics III.1280a). • Nicomachean Ethics III.2.1111b

Choice (προαίρεσις) is something someone does of his own accord (ἑκούσιον). But they are not the same, the latter being the wider. Children and animals as well as men are capable of doing something of their own accord, but they are not capable of choice.

Notes on the Text

Since the good life is the "life of action of [the part of the soul] with reason," it is necessary to understand how reason issues in action. According to Aristotle, this happens in a choice.

It is traditional to translate προαίρεσις as "choice," but it is important to keep in mind that Aristotle may not mean what we mean. He has a theory about what choice is.

Children and animals do not have choice because they do not have reason.

Our choices, because they are of our own accord, reflect the sort of person we are.

• Nicomachean Ethics III.2.1111b

⊕ Choice is not a wish (βούλησίς), though they appear closely akin. .... We wish for ends, but choose the means to our end; for example we wish to be healthy, but choose things to make us healthy.... In general, choice is concerned with things that are up to us (ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν).

Notes on the Text

"Wish is found in the part with reason and appetite and spirit in the part without reason (ἔν τε τῷ λογιστικῷ γὰρ ἡ βούλησις γίνεται, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀλόγῳ ἡ ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὁ θυμός)" (On the Soul III.9.432b). Wish is a desire belonging to reason.

What it is appropriate to deliberate about is what is up to us is.

If, for example, it is a necessary truth that all men are mortal, although we can believe it is true, we cannot sensibly deliberate about how to make it true.

⊕ "Three elements in the soul control action and the attainment of truth: namely, sensation, intellect, and desire. Of these, sensation never originates action, as is shown by the fact that animals have sensation but are not capable of action [but only reaction to stimuli of sensation]. Pursuit and avoidance in the sphere of desire correspond to affirmation and denial in the sphere of the intellect. Since virtue of character is a state with respect to choice, and choice is desire informed by deliberation, it follows that both what issues from reason must be true and the desire must be correct for choice to be good, and reason must assert and desire must pursue the same things. This thinking and truth [in the virtue of character] is practical (πρακτική). Of thinking that is theoretical (θεωρητικῆς), not practical nor productive, the well and badly [in this thinking are in the attainment of] true and false. This is the function of the whole of thinking, but of thinking that is practical, the function is truth agreeing with correct desire. The starting-point of action--that of movement, not the goal--is choice, and the starting-point of choice is desire and reasoning directed to some end. Hence choice necessarily involves intellect and thought and a certain disposition of character. For doing well and the reverse in the sphere of action necessarily involve thought and character. Thought by itself however moves nothing, but only thought directed to an end, and dealing with action" (Nicomachean Ethics VI.2.1139a). • Nicomachean Ethics III.3.1113a

Choice will be a deliberate desire of things that are up to us; for when we judge from deliberation, our desire is according to our wish.

Notes on the Text

So, for Aristotle, choice is form of desire. We have a wish for something. We deliberate about how it get it. The desire for the particular means we decide on is the choice.

• Nicomachean Ethics V1.2.1139a

Let us assume [the part of the soul with reason] has two parts, one with which we consider beings whose origins do not admit of being otherwise, and one with which we consider beings whose origin do admit of being otherwise. For when the beings are of different kinds, the parts of the soul naturally suited to each are also of different kinds, since the parts possess awareness by being similar and appropriate to their objects. Let us call one the part for knowledge (ἐπιστημονικὸν), and the other the part for calculating (λογιστικόν), since deliberating is the same as calculating, and no one deliberates about what cannot be otherwise. ... Hence we should find the best state of each part, for this is the virtue of each.

Notes on the Text

Aristotle divides the part of the soul with reason (1.a) into (1.a.1) and (1.a.2).

The human soul =
        1. part having reason
              1.a. part with reason
                    1.a.1. the ἐπιστημονικόν
                    1.a.2. the λογιστικόν
              1.b. part with reason as its controller
        2. part not having reason

⊕ "Of the two parts of the soul that have reason, practical wisdom (φρόνησις) is a virtue of one of them, of the part that has belief (δοξαστικοῦ); for belief is concerned, as practical wisdom is, with what admits of being otherwise" (Nicomachean Ethics VI.5.1140b). The virtue Aristotle calls "practical wisdom" is the virtue proper to (1.a.2).

The virtue Aristotle calls "wisdom" is the virtue proper to (1.a.1).

• Nicomachean Ethics VI.7.1141b

⊕ "[If Hippocrates] applies to me, Socrates, he will learn precisely and solely that for which he has come. That learning consists in good judgement (εὐβουλία), showing how best to order his own home; and in the affairs of the city, showing how he may have most influence in political debate and negotiating" (Protagoras 318e).


"Someone is not practically wise simply by knowing; he must also act on his knowledge" (Nicomachean Ethics VII.10.1152a). Practical wisdom (φρόνησις) is about human concerns and what is open to deliberation. For we say that to deliberate well (τὸ εὖ βουλεύεσθαι) is most of all the work of the man of practical wisdom. No one deliberates about things that cannot be otherwise nor about things that are not a means to some end, where that end is a good achievable by action. The man of sound judgement (εὔβουλος) is the man who is skilful in calculation (λογισμόν) in the pursuit of the best things to be done by a human being.

Notes on the Text

Someone with practical wisdom (the virtue of the λογιστικόν) makes the right choices. He wishes for the right ends, and he deliberates correctly about how to get them.

• Nicomachean Ethics VI.7.1141b

⊕ "[A]lthough the young may be experts in geometry and mathematics and similar branches of knowledge, we do not consider that a young man can be practically wise. Practical wisdom is concerned with particulars as well as universals, and particulars become known from experience (ἐμπειρίας), which a young man does not a possess, but a young person lacks experience, since some length of time is needed to produce it" (Nicomachean Ethics VI.8.1142a).

"Whereas the other animals live by impressions and memories, and have but a [comparatively] small share of experience, the human race lives also by art and reasoning (τέχνῃ καὶ λογισμοῖς). ... Experience seems very similar to science and art, but actually it is through experience that men acquire science and art (ἐπιστήμη καὶ τέχνη). ... Art is produced when from many notions of experience a single universal (καθόλου) judgment is formed with regard to like objects. To have a judgment that when Callias was suffering from this or that disease this or that benefited him, and similarly with Socrates and various other individuals, is a matter of experience; but to judge that it benefits all persons of a certain type, considered as a class, who suffer from this or that disease (e.g. the phlegmatic or bilious when suffering from burning fever) is a matter of art. ... We consider that knowledge and proficiency belong to art rather than to experience. .... Men of experience know that the thing is so, but do not know the why, while the others know the why and the cause (οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἔμπειροι τὸ ὅτι μὲν ἴσασι, διότι δ᾽ οὐκ ἴσασιν: οἱ δὲ τὸ διότι καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν γνωρίζουσιν)" (Metaphysics I.1.980b). Practical wisdom is not about universals (καθόλου) only. It must also come to know particulars, since it is concerned with action and action is about particulars. Hence in other areas also some people who lack knowledge are better in action than others who have knowledge. For someone who knows that light meats are digestible and healthy, but not which sort of meats are light, will not produce health; the one who knows that bird meats are healthy will be better a producing health.

Notes on the Text

What is a universal (καθόλου)?

It is a feature things share that we know in thought, not experience.

Practical wisdom requires experience. The knowledge that light meats are digestible and healthy is about the relations among universals. Someone who only knows that bird meats are healthy does not know the universal bird meats instantiate that makes them health to eat. He is not a medical theorist, but he might be more effective in producing health.

• Nicomachean Ethics Vi.9.1142a

Practical wisdom stands opposite to intellect; for intellect apprehends definitions..., while practical wisdom deals with the ultimate particular thing, which cannot be apprehended by knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), but only by perception (αἴσθησις).

Notes on the Text

Aristotle's point here can be confusing to understand.

When Aristotle is talking about ἐπιστήμη, he is thinking about a grasp of relations among universal. This, for example, is what we grasp when grasp that all men are mortal.

When we are deliberating about the means to bring about some result, we need to realize that doing this particular thing here and now is what we need to do to bring about the result.

• Nicomachean Ethics VI.13.1144b

⊕ "Practical wisdom (φρόνησις) is yoked together with virtue of character, and so is this virtue with practical wisdom. The starting points of practical wisdom are in accordance with the virtues of character, and the correctness of the virtues of character is in accordance with practical wisdom" (Nicomachean Ethics X.8.1178). It is not possible to be good strictly without practical wisdom, and it is not possible to be practically wise without virtue of character (τῆς ἠθικῆς ἀρετῆς).

Notes on the Text

In a human being who possesses the virtues of character, the part of his soul "with reason as its controller" has developed dispositions so that he acts in the appropriate ways. Someone who is brave, for example, is disposed to act in the appropriate ways in frightening situations.

This shows why the virtues of character are necessary for practical wisdom.

• Nicomachean Ethics VII.1.1145b

It would be terrible, Socrates thought, for knowledge to be in someone but mastered by something else and dragged around like a slave. He fought against this in the belief that there is no incontinence (ἀκρασίας).

Notes on the Text

Socrates made it a question whether it is possible to be overcome by pleasure. In such an experience, if it is possible, we suffer from ἀκρασία ("incontinence" or "lack of self-control").

Someone who experiences ἀκρασία does not have practical wisdom.

⊕ "The continent abides by his calculation. The incontinent abandons it. The incontinent knows that his actions are base, but he does them because of passion. The continent knows that his appetites are base, but because of reason he does not follow them" (Nicomachean Ethics VII.6.1145b) The same is true for the "continent" (ἐγκρατής). Both the continent and the "incontinent" (ἀκρατής) have unreasonable desires. The incontinent, unlike the continent, acts on these desires. The incontinent is weak. The continent is strong. Neither has practical wisdom.

• Nicomachean Ethics VII.3.1146b

⊕ "Some people, for example, those asleep or mad or drunk, both have knowledge in a way and do not have it. Moreover, this is the condition of those with passions. For anger and sexual appetite and some conditions of this sort disturb the body, and even produce fits of madness in some people. It is clear that we should say that incontinents have knowledge in a way similar to these people" (Nicomachean Ethics VII.3.1147a13). We speak of knowing in two ways, and ascribe it both to someone who has it without using it and to someone who has and is using it. Hence it will matter whether someone has the knowledge that his action is wrong, without attending to his knowledge, or both has it and attends to it. For this second case seems extraordinary, but wrong action when he does not attend to his knowledge does not seem so.

Notes on the Text

Aristotle thinks that some kind of ἀκρασία is possible.

He thinks that ἀκρασία is possible if we are not thinking about our knowledge.

• Nicomachean Ethics VII.6.1149a

⊕ "If a living thing has the capacity for perception, it has the capacity for desire. For desire comprises appetite, spirit, and wish. All animals have at least one of the senses, touch. Where there is perception, there is pleasure and pain ..., and where there are these, there is appetite: for this is desire for what is pleasant" (On the Soul II.3.414b1).

"Wish is found in the part with reason and appetite and spirit in the part without reason " (On the Soul III.9.432b). Spirit ... is like over-hasty servants who run out before they have heard all their instructions, and them carry them out wrongly, or dogs who bark at any noise at all, before investigating to see if it is a friend. In the same way, spirit, because the heat and swiftness of its nature, hears but does not the hear the instruction, and rushes off to exact penalty. For reason or imagination has shown that we are being slighted or wantonly insulted, and spirit, as though it had inferred that is right to fight this sort of thing, is irritated at once. Appetite (ἐπιθυμία), however, only needs reason or perception to say that this is pleasant, and it rushes off for gratification.

Notes on the Text

Aristotle follows Plato in thinking that one part of the soul is without reason and this part consists in "appetite" (ἐπιθυμία) and "spirit" (θυμὸς).

When these parts have not been trained properly, reason is not in control in the soul.

• Nicomachean Ethics VII.14.1153b

⊕ "Happiness evidently also requires external goods. We cannot do fine actions if we lack the resources. For, first of all, in many actions we use friends, wealth, and political power just as we use instruments. Further, deprivation of certain externals--for instance, good birth, good children, beauty--mars our blessedness. For we do not altogether have the character of happiness if we look utterly repulsive or are ill-born, solidary, or childless; and we have it even less, presumably, if our children or friends are totally bad, or were good but have died" (Nicomachian Ethics I.9.1099a).

"But the one who contemplates has no need of the external goods for his activity; but we might even say they are impediments, at least to contemplation; however, as he is a man and lives with a number of others, he chooses to do those things that are in accordance with virtue; he will therefore need such things with a view to living as a man" (Nicomachean Ethics X.8.1178b). [Happiness for a human being] requires in addition to the goods of the body, external goods and the gifts of fortune, in order that his activity may not be impeded through lack of them. Those who say that, if a man be good, he will be happy even when on the rack, or when fallen into the direst misfortune, are intentionally or unintentionally talking nonsense.

Notes on the Text

Socrates, in the Republic, argues that the those whose souls are just are happier. He argues that this is true even for the just man tortured on the rack. This man is still happier than the unjust man who is showered with the things conventionally thought to be good.

Aristotle's point is that happiness is an activity. If the activity is contemplation, the rack impedes the man from engaging in this activity. Happiness requires external goods.

• Nicomachean Ethics X.4.1175a

We might think that everyone desires pleasure, since everyone desires life. Living is a type of activity, and each of us is active towards the objects and in the way he most loves (μάλιστ᾽ ἀγαπᾷ). The musician activates his hearing in hearing melodies, the lover of knowledge activates his thinking about the objects of contemplation, and so on for each of the others. Pleasure completes their activities, and hence completes life, which they desire.

Notes on the Text

Living brings the pleasures of engaging in the activities we like. The activities we can like depend on the activities in which we can engage. Human beings can engage in the activity of hearing melodies, for example, because they have the potential to hear melodies.

As we become adults, to the extent we have the opportunity, we make the activities we like most the focal point of our lives. We become "lovers" of these activities.

The question of the good life is the question of whether there is an activity or set of activities that a human being likes most. To know the answer, we need to know how a human being functions. This tells us the activity or activities in which a human being can engage.

The function argument gives Aristotle his answer. For a human being, the possible activities are the ones in a "life of action of [the part of the soul] with reason."

No activity in which someone might engage as an individual, flute-playing for example, can overcome the problems that come with not executing the human function well.

Glaucon, in the Republic, gives an argument.

"I think, Socrates, that from this point on our inquiry becomes an absurdity—if, while life is thought to be intolerable with a ruined constitution of body even if accompanied by all the food and drink and wealth and power in the world, yet we are to inquire whether life is going to be worth living when our soul, the very thing by which we live, is in turmoil and ruined, but one can do as he pleases, but cannot do that which will rid him of badness (κακίας) and injustice (ἀδικίας) and make him possessed of justice and virtue" (Republic IV.444e).

• Nicomachean Ethics X.7.1177a

⊕ "Happiness is not found in amusement; for it would be absurd if the end were amusement, and our lifelong efforts and sufferings aimed at amusing ourselves. ... Rather, it seems correct to amuse ourselves so that we can do something serious, as Anacharsis says; for amusement would seem to be relaxation, and it because we can not toil continuously that we require relaxation. Relaxation, then, is not the end, since we pursue it to prepare for activity" (Nicomachean Ethics X.7.1176b).

"Happiness seems to be found [most] in leisure (σχολῇ), since we accept trouble so that we can be at leisure, and fight wars so that we can be at peace. The virtues concerned with action have activities in politics or war, and these require trouble. This seems completely true for actions in war, since no one chooses to fight a war, and no one continues it, for the sake of fighting. He would be a murderer if he made his friends his enemies so that there were battles and killings" (Nicomachean Ethics X.7.1177b). If happiness consists in activity in accordance with virtue (εὐδαιμονία κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν ἐνέργεια), it is reasonable that it should be activity in accordance with the highest virtue; and this will be the virtue of the best part of us. Whether this is the intellect, or whatever else is thought to rule and lead us by nature and to think about what is noble and divine, this itself being divine or as being relatively the divinest part of us, it is the activity of this part in accordance with the virtue proper to it that is complete happiness (τελεία εὐδαιμονία); and it has been stated already that this activity is the activity of contemplation (θεωρητική).

Notes on the Text

What is "complete happiness"?

The adjective τελεία means "having reached its end, finished, complete"

What Aristotle has in mind is not completely clear, but here is the idea.

Aristotle thinks the part of the soul with reason has parts. It has a part that reasons about what cannot be otherwise and a part that reasons about what can be otherwise.

These parts are the ἐπιστημονικὸν and the λογιστικόν.

The ἐπιστημονικὸν is capable of knowing. The λογιστικόν is capable of calculating.

The virtue proper to the ἐπιστημονικὸν is "wisdom" (σοφία).

The virtue is proper to the λογιστικόν is "practical wisdom" (φρόνησις).

Human beings are not born with reason. They acquire it in a natural process as they become adults. If the nonrational parts of their souls receive the proper training, and if the external circumstances are appropriate, they have practical wisdom. This, though, does not give them complete happiness. They have not achieved their full potential as human beings.

To live the most beneficial life a human being can live, they need to acquire the knowledge that constitutes wisdom and to have the leisure to exercise this knowledge in contemplation.

• Nicomachean Ethics X.7.1177b

⊕ "It seems likely that the man who whose activity is according to the intellect, and who cultivates his intellect and keeps it in the best condition, is also the man most beloved of the gods. For if they pay attention to us, as they seem to, it would be reasonable for them to take pleasure in that part of man which is best and most akin to themselves, namely the intellect" (Nicomachean Ethics X.8.1179a). The activity of the intellect is felt to excel in serious worth, consisting as it does in contemplation, and to aim at no end beyond itself, and also to contain a pleasure proper to itself, and therefore augmenting its activity. If accordingly the attributes of this activity are found to be self-sufficiency, leisure, such freedom from fatigue as is possible for man, is complete human happiness—provided it be granted a complete span of life, for nothing that belongs to happiness can be incomplete.

Notes on the Text

• Nicomachean Ethics X.7.1178a

⊕ "These pleasures are proper to them [appetite and spirit], if that which is best for each thing may be said to be most proper to it. So if [these parts of the soul follow reason] and there is no internal dissension, each part will keep to its own task and [thus the soul will be] just, and also each will reap its own pleasures, the best and the truest as far as possible" (Republic IX.586d). For what is proper to each thing's nature is supremely best and pleasantest for it. Hence for a human being the life according to the intellect (ὁ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν βίος) is so given that man is this most of all. This life, then, will be happiest. Secondly the life according to the other virtue. For the activities in accordance with this are human. We display justice, courage and the other virtues in our intercourse with our fellows, by abiding by what fits each person in contracts, services, all types of actions, and also feelings. All these appear to be human conditions.

Notes on the Text

A human being is "happiest" (εὐδαιμονέστατος) when he lives according to the intellect.

What is the life according to the intellect?

• Nicomachean Ethics X.8.1178b

⊕ "It is not surprising, then, that we regard neither ox nor horse nor any other kind of animal as happy, since noen of them can share in this sort of activity. And for the same reason a child is not happy either, since his age prevents him from doing these sorts of actions; and if he is called happy, he is being congratulated because of anticipated happiness" (Nicomachean Ethics I.9.1099b).

"Now it is agreed [that happiness] is the greatest and best of human goods (and we say 'human' because there might very likely also be a happiness (εὐδαιμονία) belonging to some higher being, for instance a god); since none of the other animals, which are inferior in nature to men, share in the name, for a horse is not happy (εὐδαίμων), nor is a bird nor a fish nor any other existing thing whose designation does not indicate that it possesses in its nature a share of something divine (θείου), but it is by some other mode of participating in things good that one of them has a better life and another a worse" (Eudemian Ethics I.1217a). We all suppose that the gods are alive and in work, since surely they are not asleep like Endymion [aa mythical figure who chose eternal sleep so that he would exist forever]. And if someone is alive, and action is excluded, and production [the making of things] even more, nothing is left but contemplation (θεωρία). Hence the activity of the gods superior in blessedness is contemplation. The human activity most akin to this is the nature of happiness. An indication is that other animals have no happiness, being completely deprived of contemplation. The whole life of the gods is blessed, and human life is blessed to the extent that it resembles this sort of activity, but none of the other animals is happy because none shares in contemplation at all (because none of them have reason). Happiness extends just so far as contemplation, and those to whom contemplation more fully belongs are more truly happy, not accidentally, but according to contemplation. Contemplation is valuable according to itself. Happiness, therefore, must be some form of contemplation

Notes on the Text

The life according to the intellect is the life of contemplation.