Socrates is Like a Torpedo Fish

⊕
Torpedo torpedo, Linnaeus 1758.
Native to the Mediterranean Sea. Can emit electric shocks. "Before I had as much as made your acquaintance, I had heard that you are simply perplexed yourself and that you make others perplexed too; and now, as it seems to me, you are bewitching and using spells and enchanting me, so that I am completely at a loss. And if I may make a joke, I consider that both in your appearance and in other respects you are altogether like the flat torpedo sea-fish; for it benumbs anyone who approaches and touches it, and something of the sort is what I find you have done to me now. For in truth I feel my soul and my tongue quite benumbed, and I have no answer to give you. And yet on countless occasions I have made abundant speeches on virtue to various people--and very good speeches they were, so I thought--but now I cannot say one word as to what it is. I think you are right in not taking a trip away from home or living abroad; for if you went on like this as a stranger in any other city you would very likely be taken up for a wizard" (Meno 79e).

Argument

⊕   "Why, on what lines will you look, Socrates, for a thing of whose nature you know nothing at all? Pray, what sort of thing, amongst those that you know not, will you treat us to as the object of your search? Or even supposing, at the best, that you hit upon it, how will you know it is the thing you did not know?
  I understand the point you would make, Meno. Do you see what a captious argument you are introducing--that, forsooth, a man cannot inquire either about what he knows or about what he does not know? For he cannot inquire about what he knows, because he knows it, and in that case is in no need of inquiry; nor again can he inquire about what he does not know, since he does not know about what he is to inquire.
  Now does it seem to you to be a good argument, Socrates?
  It does not" (Meno 80d).

"They say that the soul of man is immortal, and at one time comes to an end, which is called dying, and at another is born again, but never perishes. ... Seeing then that the soul is immortal and has been born many times, and has beheld all things both in this world and in the nether realms, she has acquired knowledge of all and everything; so that it is no wonder that she should be able to recollect all that she knew before about virtue and other things" (Meno 81b). 1.  Someone either knows or does not know what virtue is.
2.  If he knows what virtue is, he cannot inquirer into what virtue is.
3.  If he does not know what virtue is, he cannot inquire into what virtue it.
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4.  He cannot inquire into what virtue is.

Explanation

1. Either someone knows or does not know. There is no other possibility.

2. In his restatement of Meno's argument, Socrates say that no one can "inquire about what he knows, because he knows it, and in that case is in no need of inquiry."

3. Socrates restates this premise as follows: "nor again can he inquire about what he does not know, since he does not know about what he is to inquire."

Evaluation

1. The argument is valid. The conclusion cannot be false if the premises are true.

⊕

It is not immediately clear which premise Socrates means to deny.

He can seem to deny (2). He uggests that asking and trying to answer questions about virtue is a way of trying to remember something. By clearing away false beliefs, the questioning helps one "recollect" something he knows but is having trouble bringing to mind.

⊕ Socrates can also seem to deny (3) in that he suggests that the knowledge the soul possesses when it enters the body becomes true opinion because the soul acquires false beliefs.

  "What do you think, Meno? Was there any opinion that he did not give as an answer of his own thought?
  No, they were all his own.
  But you see, he did not know, as we were saying a while since.
  That is true.
  Yet he had in him these opinions, had he not?
  Yes.
  So that he who does not know about any matters, whatever they be, may have true opinions on such matters, about which he knows nothing?
  Apparently.
  And at this moment those opinions have just been stirred up in ⊕ "True opinions do not care to stay for long, and run away out of the human soul, and thus are of no great value until one makes them fast by working out the cause (αἰτίας λογισμῷ). And this process, Meno, is recollection, as we have agreed. But when once they are fastened, in the first place they turn into knowledge, and in the second, are abiding. And this is why knowledge is more prized than right opinion" (Meno 98a). him, like a dream; but if he were repeatedly asked these same questions in a variety of forms, you know he will have in the end as exact a knowledge of them as anyone.
  So it seems.
  Without anyone having taught him, and only through questions put to him, he will understand, recovering the knowledge out of himself?
  Yes.
⊕   And is not this recovery of knowledge, in himself and by himself, recollection?
  Certainly.
  And must he not have either once acquired or always had the knowledge he now has?
  Yes.
  Now if he always had it, he was always in a state of knowing; and if he acquired it all some time, he could not have acquired it in this life. Or has someone taught him geometry? You see, he can do the same as this with all geometry and every branch of knowledge. Now, can anyone have taught him all this? You ought surely to know, especially as he was born and bred in your house.
  Well, I know that no one has ever taught him.
  And has he these opinions, or has he not?
  He must have them, Socrates, evidently.
  And if he did not acquire them in this present life, is it not obvious at once that he had them and learnt them during some other time?
  Apparently.
  And this must have been the time when he was not a human being?
  Yes.
  So if in both of these periods--when he was and was not a human being--he has had true opinions in him which have only to be awakened by questioning to ⊕ What is the "state of having learned" (μεμαθηκυῖα)? become knowledge, his soul must have had this state of having learned throughout all time? For clearly he has always either been or not been a human being.
  Evidently.
  And if the truth of all things that are is always in our soul, then the soul must be immortal; so that you should take heart and, whatever you do not happen to know at present--that is, what you do not remember--you must endeavor to search out and recollect?
  What you say commends itself to me, Socrates, I know not how.
  And I think I am right too. As far as the other points are concerned, I would not altogether take a stand on the argument; but that we will be better and braver and less helpless if we think one should search for what he does not know than if we thought it is not possible to discover what we do not know and that we do not need to search for it—this is a point for which I am determined to do battle, so far as I am able, both in word and deed" (Meno 85b).

Perseus Digital Library

Plato, Meno

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon

ζητεῖν, zētein, verb, "to search, or inquire into"